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Almost from the beginning of the Republic, Congress and
the President have sparred over their respective powers.' These
I Early on, the executive branch played a relatively minor role in both the
legislative process and in administration. One significant exception to this executive
dependency was in foreign affairs, where early Presidents took a good deal of initiative.
Examples include Jefferson's undertaking the Louisiana Purchase and Monroe's unilat-
eral promulgation of the doctrine that bears his name. Andrew Jackson seized the
initiative from Congress on a number of fronts, generating intense controversy in the
process and leading to a subsequently reversed Senate censure resolution. Jackson was
followed by a series of weaker executives until the election of Abraham Lincoln, who
held office during a period of unprecedented national crisis. See generally E. HARGROVE
& M. NELSON, PRESIDENTS, Porcs, AND POUCY 45-50 (1984).
Since the Civil War, the federal government has undertaken vastiy increased
responsibilities. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Congress played a dominant
role, often with presidential acquiescence. The twentieth century has seen cycles of more
active executive leadership interspersed with periods of congressional ascendancy. Id. at
49-50; B. KARL, EXECUTwE REORGANIZATION AND T NEW DEAL 30-31, 34-35, 166-68,
186-87 (1963); H. LAsI, THE AmmRicAN PRESIDENCY 127-37 (1940). The balance began
moving toward the White House under Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, who
as a young academic had despaired of the possibility of a strong executive under the
political conditions of the time. See W. WmsON, CONGRESSIONM GOVERMNT (1885).
Wilson was succeeded by weaker Presidents until Franklin D. Roosevelt seemingly altered
the congressional-executive balance permanently. The perceived excesses of subsequent
Presidents, particularly Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, in turn gave rise to fears
of executive domination. Indeed, some of the most vocal critics of executive power
earlier had been celebrants of the rise of the presidency at the expense of Congress. See,
e.g., A. SCLESINGER, JR., THE ImPERiAL PRESIDENCY (1973). The difficulties of Gerald
Ford and Jimmy Carter, by contrast, prompted many observers to wonder whether the
institution of the presidency had become too weak, a concern that has been much
subordinated by the apparent success of Ronald Reagan. See, e.g., Greenstein, The Need
for an Early Appraisal of the Reagan Presidency, in THE REAGAN PRmIDENCY 1, 6-7
(F. Greenstein ed. 1983); Reeves, The Ideological Election, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 26, 29. But see Lowi, Ronald Reagan-Revolutionary?, in THE
REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND TE GOVERNING OF AmERICA 29, 47-48 (L. Salamon & M.
Lund eds. 1985).
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conflicts arise from both political and institutional sources. At
the political level, Congress represents "the people," in whose
name the Constitution was established. 2 Only the President,
however, has a truly national constituency. Thus, conflict based
upon different political perspectives is almost inevitable.
A more fundamental institutional aspect of the problem
arises directly from the Constitution. That charter provided for
a government of separated powers assigned respectively to leg-
islative, executive, and judicial branches. 3 In addition, it estab-
lished a complex set of checks and balances to structure the
relationships between and among those three branches. In short,
the Constitution "created a government of separated institutions
sharing powers." 4 These relationships provide ample opportunity
for disagreement.
Examples of the interactions of the three branches abound.
Congress has the power to legislate, but bills embodying the
results of its deliberations must be presented to the President
for approval before becoming law; in the absence of such ap-
proval, the congressional decision still may prevail if both houses
vote by a supermajority to override the executive's veto.5 Simi-
larly, the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
6
but only Congress may declare war.7 The President may make
treaties, but only with the advice and consent of a supermajority
of the Senate.8 The President also appoints officers of the United
States, but the Senate once again must give its advice and
consent. 9 And while Congress may fix the date on which it
convenes, 0 determine the qualifications of its members," and
2 For a recent analysis of the meaning of the phrase "We the People," see
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1017-
18, 1023-43 (1984).
' U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 1 (legislative); art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (executive); art. III, § 1
(judicial).
4 R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 26 (rev. ed. 1980) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
" Id.
I d. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
I d. § 5, cl. 1.
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adopt rules of procedure, 12 the President may call the legislative
branch into special session and resolve disagreements concerning
the time of adjournment.13
Many of the struggles between Congress and the President
have concerned money. Among them have been the bitter nine-
teenth-century debates over federal funding of internal improve-
12 Id. cl. 2. But cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (overturning House
of Representatives' decision to exclude one of its members).
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
The judiciary has an analogous symbiotic relationship with the political branches.
The lower federal courts were "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" by legislation passed by
Congress and approved by the President, id. art. III, § 1, and all article III judges are
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, id. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2. Moreover, Congress retains the power to limit the jurisdiction of the courts. Id.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
The checks and balances involving the judiciary have also led to periodic conflicts
with the political branches. Perhaps the most famous early dispute concerned the efforts
of President Jefferson and his supporters to prevent the Supreme Court from deciding
the politically charged case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See
infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
The exceptions clause of article III, § 2, together with Congress' inherent power
to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by virtue of its power to create those
bodies in the first instance, Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), has led to
numerous legislative efforts to restrict or eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
See G. GuNnHER, CoNs'rrrnoNAs LAw 47-48 (1lth ed. 1985). The precise contours of
congressional powers to establish exceptions to the jurisdiction of article III tribunals
and to abolish the lower federal courts that have been created are matters of some
scholarly controversy. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Hart, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HALv. L. REv.
1362 (1953); Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Juris-
diction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VML.
L. Rnv. 900 (1982); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
95 HAmv. L. REv. 17 (1981).
Other conflicts have involved the executive branch. One notorious instance was
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's so-called Court-packing proposal, designed to circum-
vent judicial hostility to the New Deal. Perhaps the most famous recent example arose
during the Watergate affair, when President Nixon implied that he might disregard a
Supreme Court ruling enforcing a subpoena issued by the Special Prosecutor unless the
decision was "definitive." See E. DREw, WASHINGTON JourmNAL 5, 45, 283, 304-05, 328
(1975). In an even more contemporary situation, Attorney General Edvin Meese sug-
gested that the executive branch might not deem itself bound by a lower court's
constitutional ruling. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 839-
90 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979, 991-92 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986), reh'g en bane denied,
Nos. 85-5226 & 85-5377 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 1987); Waas & Toobin, Meese's Power Grab,
NEw REPUBLiC, May 19, 1986, at 15.
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ments and the more recent "guns or butter" controversy that
emerged simultaneously with increased American military in-
volvement in Southeast Asia two decades ago. These conflicts
are perfectly understandable because the purposes and amount
of government expenditure suggest who has prevailed in the
debate over national policy.'
4
Other struggles have involved personnel, specifically control
over the removal of nonelected officials. This, too, is unsurpris-
ing, for if "the power to tax involves the power to destroy,"' 
5
the power to remove an official would seem to implicate the
power to control that official's actions. 6 The debate over this
question erupted in the First Congress, was left unresolved in
Marbury v. Madison, 7 reached a rancorous crescendo in the
dispute over the Tenure of Office Act during Reconstruction,
and has recurred at frequent intervals ever since.' s In this cen-
tury, the Supreme Court has attempted to impose a constitu-
tional framework upon the debate. The first decision which
sought to establish this framework, Myers v. United States,19
held that Congress could not play any formal role in the dis-
charge of federal officers. The second, Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,20 restricted the Myers principle to "purely execu-
tive" officials and allowed Congress to prescribe statutory
grounds for removal of "independent" officers.
Most recently, the subjects of money and removal converged
in Bowsher v. Synar .2 In that case, on the final day of his final
Term on the bench, Chief Justice Burger delivered an opinion
invalidating the central feature of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known as the
14 See A. WIZDAVSKY, THE PoLmcs oF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 4 (1964).
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). But cf. Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The power to tax
is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.").
1<' See R. CusmemN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY CoMMISSIONS 454 (1941);
Burkoff, Appointment and Removal Under the Federal Constitution: The Impact of
Buckley' v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1335, 1335 (1976).
17 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts II-IV.
" 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See infra Part III.A.
: 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See infra Part III.B.




Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.2 The ruling rested on the place-
ment of control over the deficit-reduction process in the hands
of the Comptroller General. A previously enacted federal statute
had given Congress, rather than the President, authority to
initiate the process of removing the Comptroller and, in some
circumstances, permitted the legislative branch to fire that offi-
cial over the express objection of the President. On the basis of
Myers and Humphrey's Executor, the Chief Justice held that
the intrusive congressional role in the procedure for removing
the Comptroller General precluded that official from exercising
the powers which Gramm-Rudman-Hollings conferred upon him.
This Article suggests that the significance of the conflict
between Congress and the President over the removal power has
been greatly exaggerated. The Constitution is silent on the ques-
tion of removal. The textual provision dealing with appoint-
ments, from which one might reason by analogy, lends support
to two contradictory interpretations: first, that removal is an
exclusively presidential prerogative, subject perhaps to statutory
for-cause requirements; and second, that removal is a function
which the chief executive and the Senate share. On practical and
historical grounds, however, the former view has prevailed. At
the same time, a broad array of checks and balances makes it
very costly for the President to dismiss any official. Moreover,
Congress retains a sizeable arsenal of weapons by which it may
exercise more effective control over official conduct than is
realistically afforded by the threat of removal. Thus, the formal
power to remove cannot serve as a satisfactory operational def-
inition of the power to control official conduct.
This analysis has implications for the larger debate between
formalists and checks-and-balances advocates that has pervaded
discussions of the relationships among the branches since the
eighteenth century. Formalists favor maximum feasible inde-
pendence for each branch in performing its assigned functions; 2
checks-and-balances advocates emphasize the essential interde-
pendence of the branches.24 The present discussion underscores
2 Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat. 1063 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-907, 921-
922 (Supp. III 1985)).
See, e.g., M. VItE, CONSTITUToNALSM ANrD THE SEPARATioN oF Povvina 13-18
(1967).
24 See, e.g., J. CHoPER, JtDiciAL REvIw AND T NATIONAL POITIcAL PROCESS
275-314 (1980).
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the limited significance of any rule allocating authority with
respect to removals and urges a focus upon more meaningful
devices to protect the integrity of our political system.
Accordingly, this Article further suggests that the Court's
reasoning in Bowsher follows logically from Myers and Hum-
phrey's Executor and is consistent with the formalistic approach
adopted in other recent separation-of-powers cases. In a larger
sense, however, this formalistic reasoning overlooks the coun-
tervailing factors which make the removal of the Comptroller
General exceedingly unlikely and obscures the fundamental con-
stitutional question raised by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
mechanism. That question involves the ability of elected officials
to make the most basic political judgments concerning the size
and shape of the federal government.
Part I of this Article describes the factual setting of the
Bowsher litigation. Part II reviews the legal developments relat-
ing to the power to remove federal officials from the First
Congress until the beginning of the twentieth century. Part III
critically analyzes Myers, Humphrey's Executor, and the Court's
one other modem pre-Bowsher decision on removal, with par-
ticular emphasis upon the historical and political context of each
case. Part IV critically analyzes the Bowsher decision. That
section also examines the meaning of the term "independence"
as applied to administrative agencies in order to assess the ex-
ecutive branch's far-reaching assertion that the Constitution gives
the President absolute power to remove any nonjudicial officer
whom he appoints. Finally, Part V suggests an alternative basis
for the Bowsher decision, one that focuses upon the concept of
political responsibility for setting government policy, and ex-
plores some of the implications of the theory that Congress may
not delegate its ultimate power to make basic budgetary judg-
ments.
I. THE CASE
A. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
For the past generation, the federal government regularly has
spent more money than it has received.2 This deficit has been
25 The federal goverment operated at a deficit in 30 of the 35 years preceding the
1987]
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an important political issue; both Jimmy Carter in 1976 and
Ronald Reagan in 1980 pledged to balance the budget within
four years, but neither succeeded. By 1985, there was widespread
agreement that the magnitude of the deficit had become a sig-
nificant problem. 26 Moreover, the situation seemed to be dete-
riorating: although Congress had reformed its budgeting
procedures in the wake of protracted disputes with President
Nixon,27 the annual deficit had increased rapidly during the first
part of the decade and seemed likely to remain at unprecedented
levels for the foreseeable future. 28
Faced with this prospect, Congress passed the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act. 29 The Act proposed a phased elimination of
the annual budget shortfall by establishing progressively lower
maximum deficit amounts, culminating in a balanced budget by
fiscal year 1991.30 It did so by imposing automatic, across-the-
adoption of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Peterson, The New Politics of Deficits, in THE
NEw DmECTION iN AmpRICAN POLITICS 365, 367-70 (J. Chubb & P. Peterson eds. 1985).
6 Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1080
n.11.
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)). See generally Mikva & Hertz, Impoundment of Funds-The Courts, The
Congress and The President: A Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 335 (1974).
1 Between 1981 and 1985, "the annual deficit has grown from $59 billion to $220
billion . . . ." 131 CONG. REc. H9613 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1985) (remarks of Rep.
Andrews). One official estimate projected that, under plausible budgetary and economic
assumptions, the national debt would more than double to $2.8 trillion between 1985
and 1990. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BuDoEr OUTLOOK: FIscAL
YEARS 1987-1991: A REPORT TO TBE SENATE AND HOUSE CoN2errJEs ON THE BUmET
(pt. 1) xxiii (1986).
The original version of this legislation was introduced in the Senate on September
25, 1985, as a rider to a resolution to increase the national debt limit. That version had
not been printed when debate began nor had any committee considered it before it was
presented. The early floor debate generated numerous questions that led the sponsors to
make extensive changes in their proposal. See Drew, A Reporter in Washington, THE
NEw YORKER, Nov. 4, 1985, at 131. Although these truncated procedures generated
criticism in the Senate, see id. at 140-42, they do not appear to have affected the Court's
view of the case. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926-27 (1983) (noting that consid-
eration of the legislative veto resolution at issue had been deferred virtually to the last
possible day and that the resolution had not been printed at the time it was adopted);
Nagel, The Legislative Veto, the Constitution, and the Courts, 3 CoNsT. Comm. 61, 71-
72 (1986) (suggesting that the emphasis upon these facts in the Court's opinion reflected
a more general judicial hostility to the legislative process).
" 2 U.S.C. § 622(7) (Supp. III 1985). The annual deficit limits are fixed as follows:
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board spending cuts if the projected deficit exceeded the maxi-
mum deficit amount for the year. The cuts would become effec-
tive without any separate congressional or presidential action.
Mandatory expenditure reductions could be avoided only through
legislation embodying some alternative way of reducing the def-
icit to the statutory limit.
31
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings process begins with the infor-
mation available on August 15.32 By August 20, the Directors
of the Office of Management and Budget and of the Congres-
sional Budget Office are required to estimate the deficit for the
fiscal year starting on October 1 and to report their projections
to the Comptroller General.3 1 If the projected deficit exceeds the
statutory limit, 34 the Directors are to calculate, on a program-
by-program basis, uniform percentage expenditure reductions to
meet the target.35 Half of the reductions are to be allocated to
defense programs and half to nondefense programs, subject to
specified exceptions and limitations.3 6 If the Directors are unable
to agree upon any item in their report, they must average their
differences; their report to the Comptroller General, however,
must include both the averaged measure and the divergent figures
that gave rise to the disagreement.
37







" The automatic spending reduction mechanism is suspended during periods of
actual or projected recession. Id. § 904(a).
32 The actual process by which Congress adopts a budget begins much earlier in
the year. The schedule for the entire legislative budget process is contained in the
Congressional Budget Act.
" Id. § 901(a)(l). Since the 1986 fiscal year had already begun when the legislation
was enacted, the reporting date for that year was January 15.
14 Id. In fiscal years 1986 and 1991, the Act is triggered if the projected deficit
exceeds the maximum deficit amount. In the intervening fiscal years, the Act is triggered
only if the projected deficit exceeds the maximum deficit amount by at least $10 billion.
3' Id. § 901(a)(2).
-6 The exceptions and limitations are contained in id. §§ 905-907. The most
prominent programs exempted from reduction under the Act are Social Security and
veterans' benefits.
11 Id. § 901(a)(5).
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By August 25, the Comptroller General must make his own
projections, based upon the submissions by the OMB and CBO
Directors, of the deficit and of the program-by-program reduc-
tions needed to comply with the Act, and to report his findings
to Congress and the President.3 1 If the Comptroller General
determines that the expenditure-reduction mechanism has been
triggered, the President is obligated to issue a "sequestration"
order by September 1.39 In issuing that order, the President is
legally bound by the Comptroller General's determinations and
must order spending cuts in strict accordance with those deter-
minations. 40 The President simultaneously must transmit a mes-
sage to Congress explaining the sequestration order in detail.4'
After the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, the
Directors of OMB and CBO reassess their projections in light
of any newly available information. Their revised report is to be
prepared under the same ground rules as their preliminary one
and must be delivered to the Comptroller General by October
5. On October 10, the Comptroller is to submit a revised report
to the President.42 On October 15, the President issues a final
Congress intended that the Directors of OMB and CBO independently estimate the
deficit and any necessary spending reductions, then attempt to resolve possible differences
by mutual consultation. They are to resort to averaging only if they cannot reach
agreement. H.R. CoNSF. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74, reprinted in 1985
U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS 988, 990-91.
38 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985). The Comptroller General is required to
act "with due regard for the data, assumptions, and methodologies" used by OMB and
CBO and is to prepare his own report "based on the estimates, determinations, and
specifications" of those agencies.
39 Id. § 902(a)(1).
- The section governing the contents of sequestration orders, provides in relevant
part:
The order must provide for reductions in the manner specified in [this
Act], must incorporate the provisions of the [Comptroller General's] report
... and must be consistent with such report in all respects. The President
may not modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations, spec-
ifications, bases, amounts, or percentages set forth in [that] report ... in
determining the reductions to be specified in the order ....
Id. § 902(a)(3).
41 Id. § 902(a)(5). In this message the President may also propose alternative ways
of reaching the deficit limit. Id. § 902(c). Unless Congress formally approves such an
alternative, however, the sequestration order takes effect automatically.
42 Id. § 901(c). These revised estimates must utilize the same assumptions, meth-
odologies, and criteria as the preliminary reports.
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sequestration order. Once more, the Comptroller General's de-
terminations legally bind the President.
43
The Act authorized expedited judicial review."4 It also con-
tained a so-called fallback clause that would take effect if any
aspect of the automatic deficit-reduction mechanism were inval-
idated. If that clause were to be triggered, a joint congressional
committee composed of the members of the budget committees
of each chamber would receive the reports from the Directors
of OMB and CBO and prepare a joint resolution that is consid-
ered under special procedural rules. If the resolution becomes
effective, either through presidential approval or congressional




A dozen congressional opponents and the National Treasury
Employees Union promptly filed suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the legislation. 46 They asserted two basic theories.
First, the automatic deficit-reduction mechanism unconstitution-
ally delegated legislative power to the President and the other
officials who were assigned duties under the statute. Second, the
powers assigned to the Comptroller General and the Director of
the CBO, positions characterized as part of the legislative branch,
must be exercised by executive branch personnel. 47 The Depart-
ment of Justice strongly defended against the delegation chal-
41 Id. § 902(b). The President may also propose alternatives to the final seques-
tration order for congressional consideration. Again, however, the sequestration order
becomes effective unless the legislative branch formally approves an alternative proposal.
See supra note 41.
" Id. § 922. This section provided for initial hearing of any constitutional
challenges by a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and for direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
41 Id. § 922(0.
41 The plaintiffs asserted standing under provisions authorizing any member of
Congress "or any other person adversely affected by any action taken under this [Act]"
to file a constitutional challenge. Id. § 922(a). The union alleged that the suspension of
cost-of-living adjustments to which its retired federal employee members otherwise would
have been entitled satisfied the statutory standing requirement.
41 626 F. Supp. at 1378. These suits were filed separately but consolidated by the
district court. After the consolidation order was issued, the Senate, the House, and the
Comptroller General intervened to defend the Act.
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
lenge but vigorously attacked the assignment of the power to
implement the Act to officials not removable at the will of the
President.
48
In a per curiam opinion, a special three-judge court rejected
the delegation claim but invalidated the automatic deficit-reduc-
tion mechanism because of the Comptroller General's central
role. Reviewing the delegation claim "on the basis of the def-
erential post-Schechter cases decided by the Supreme Court," 4 9
the panel found that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings contained ade-
quate standards for the Directors of OMB and CBO and the
Comptroller General to exercise their duties.50 It found these
standards in "the totality of the Act's ... definitions, context,
-' Id. at 1379, 1391.
49 Id. at 1384. The reference in the quotation is to A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). -
'0 Id. at 1387-89.
The district court further held that the preclusion of judicial review of the economic
data, assumptions, and methods that form the basis of the Comptroller General's report
did not vitiate the delegation. Id. at 1389-90. At least one of the cases relied upon in
support of this conclusion is not entirely on point. In Southern Ry. v. Seaboard Allied
Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454-64 (1979), the Supreme Court found unreviewable the
refusal of the Interstate Commerce Commission to suspend or investigate a proposed
general increase in rail freight rates. The Court reasoned that it would be inappropriate
to permit a single aggrieved party to delay an across-the-board general increase because
of dissatisfaction with a particular rate since the unhappy shipper could contest that rate
in a separate administrative proceeding that was itself subject to judicial review. Under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, by contrast, judicial review of certain issues is absolutely
barred.
The other case the district court relied upon also is arguably distinguishable. In
Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court held that the
question of agency compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612
(1982), was not reviewable. The court reached that conclusion, however, on the basis of
a statutory provision that made the agency's analysis under the Act a part of the record
in any judicial challenge to the validity of an administrative rule. By contrast, no
provision of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings specifically incorporates the economic data, as-
sumptions, and methods underlying a sequestration order into the record on judicial
review.
It appears that any challenge to a sequestration order would focus only upon
compliance with the procedures set out in the statute and upon whether the required
calculations had been made, not upon the accuracy or reasonableness of the bases for
those calculations. In light of the exceedingly short time period within which the
calculations are to be made, however, it seems likely that Congress reasoned that judicial
challenges to the data, assumptions, and methods would frustrate the purposes of the
Act and that courts in any event would not be able to resolve the arcane questions that
might be raised in litigation over such questions.
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and reference to past administrative practice." s' The Comptroller
General could not perform the tasks entrusted to him under the
Act, however, because the procedure for removing him from
office was unconstitutional.
5 2
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on separation-
of-powers grounds.13 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion
invalidated the automatic expenditure-reduction mechanism based
upon the following argument: (1) an officer controlled by Con-
gress may not constitutionally exercise executive power; (2)
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings vests the Comptroller General with
executive power; (3) the Comptroller General is removable by
Congress; (4) this arrangement renders the Comptroller General
subservient to the legislative branch; therefore (5) the Comp-
troller General may not perform the functions which the Act
assigned to him.1
4
11 626 F. Supp. at 1389.
The district court also rejected a claim that the powers at issue were nondelegable
per se. Id. at 1385-87. For further discussion of this question, see infra Part V.
;2 626 F. Supp. at 1394-403.
The district court rejected the argument that this aspect of the case was not ripe
for determination because there had been no attempt to remove the Comptroller General.
The court reasoned that this particular challenge rested upon the proposition that the
very existence of the removal provision would have an immediate impact upon the
Comptroller's performance of his duties. Accordingly, it was appropriate to resolve the
merits of this constitutional question at this time. Id. at 1392-93.
'3 At the threshold, the Court held that at least the individual member of the
NTEU, who had been added as a plaintiff, 106 S. Ct. at 3185 n.2, had standing.
Accordingly, it avoided a decision on the standing of either the congressional plaintiffs
or the union. Id. at 3186. The issue of the standing of members of Congress has been
a matter of some controversy, as the district court noted. 626 F. Supp. at 1381 n.7; see
generally McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. Ray. 241
(1981). The Supreme Court recently dismissed as moot a case in which the question of
congressional standing had been squarely presented. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734
(1987). The union appears to have standing to represent its members, provided the
members as individuals would have standing. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
511 (1975); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
The Court also agreed with the district court that the case was ripe. The justices
reasoned that the existence of the removal provision, although so far unused, would
have immediate effects upon the Comptroller General's performance of his duties under
the statute. 106 S. Ct. at 3189 n.5.
'4 Justices Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined the Chief Justice's
opinion. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment. Justices
White and Blackmun dissented.
The majority did not address the merits of the delegation claim. 106 S. Ct. at 3193
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The Court's analysis has a surface plausibility. The major
premise, that Congress may not exercise dominance over exec-
utive officials, is unexceptionable. The Court's conclusion fol-
lows from all of the intermediate premises. But one need not
apply the "close scrutiny' 55 that the Chief Justice invokes to
see that the conclusion is far less obvious than the opinion
implies. It is not wholly clear that the Comptroller General
exercises executive power or that he is subservient to Congress.
Even if all of these propositions are formally correct, however,
they are a flimsy reed for the conclusion that they must support.
To understand why, it is necessary to appreciate the shifting
grounds of political conflict over the removal power. The seeds
of that conflict were planted in the Constitution itself.
II. EARLY STRUGGLES OVER T=E REMOVAL POWER
A. The Constitutional Text
The Constitution says very little about the removal of federal
officials. The only explicit provision on the subject states that
"[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors. '56 This language, read literally as part of a
document that says nothing else about the matter, might imply
n.10. The dissenters endorsed the district court's analysis rejecting the delegation chal-
lenge. Id. at 3208 n.5 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 3215 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The concurring opinion adopts a type of delegation analysis, focusing upon the rela-
tionship of the delegate to the legislative branch rather than upon the absence of
appropriate standards in the delegation itself. Id. at 3196-99, 3202-05 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). None of the parties framed the issue in precisely these
terms, however.
11 Id. at 3189.
-1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
In addition to this solitary substantive point, the Constitution contains two sections
that deal with the procedural aspects of the subject. The House of Representatives,
which "shall have the sole Power of Impeachment," id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, may initiate
the process of ousting civil officers. The Senate may remove upon a supermajority vote
by virtue of its possession of "the sole Power to try all Impeachments .... [But] no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present." Id. § 3, cI. 6.
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that civil officers may be removed only through the impeachment
process.1
7
By contrast, the power of appointment is dealt with in greater
detail. In general, the President nominates and the Senate con-
firms federal officers; exceptions to this procedure are permitted,
however, for inferior officers. The appointments clause provides:
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.5
This seemingly clear provision, however, contains an impor-
tant ambiguity. While it says that Senate confirmation is gen-
erally required for the appointment of federal officers, it does
not clearly define "appointment." The language of the clause
lends itself to two possible interpretations. First, because the
President merely nominates but the Senate must consent, the
appointment power may be shared. Second, because the clause
permits the Senate simply to obstruct but not actually to nomi-
nate federal officers, it may vest the entire appointment power
in the President, subject only to senatorial veto.5 9
Resolution of this interpretive question is important. Assum-
ing that civil officers may be discharged by means other than
impeachment, the removal power might be seen as incident to
the appointment power. If the appointment power is shared, the
Senate has a right to participate in, although perhaps not to
L. TRINE, AMEmICAN CONSTrrUTiONAL LAw 186 n.2 (1978).
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
" The appointments clause contains another important ambiguity. It does not
define the "inferior Officers" whose selection Congress may vest "in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." The Supreme Court
avoided a definitive resolution of that question until recently. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 120-41 (1976) (per curiam); see generally C. MORGANSTON, THE AppoINT NG AN
REMOVAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 4-14, 64-121 (1929, reprint
1976); Burkoff, supra note 16, at 1336-79.
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initiate, removals. If this power is not shared, the President has
the sole authority to remove. Even if the latter is the proper
interpretation, however, it leaves open the question whether
Congress may limit the President's discretion in exercising the
removal power.
Despite the Constitution's silence on the point, Alexander
Hamilton argued that the Senate would have to approve the
dismissal of any official whose appointment it had confirmed.
In The Federalist No. 77, Hamilton explained that, just as the
upper chamber's role in the appointment process would promote
governmental stability, senatorial advice and consent for remov-
als would prevent wholesale purges upon a change in the presi-
dency. Both the possibility of Senate rejection and the opprobrium
that might follow from even a successful attempt to replace
federal officers would discourage the establishment of a spoils
system. 60 However accurately this view might have reflected the
framers' intentions, it was hardly binding as constitutional inter-
pretation. Barely one year later, the whole question was thrown
into the political arena, where it has reappeared sporadically
ever since.
B. Historical Practice Before the Twentieth Century
The apparent clarity of the constitutional scheme relating to
appointments broke down virtually from the outset of the First
Congress. Although the President nominally was to propose
appointees, the practice of senatorial courtesy and other informal
devices that effectively permitted legislators to dictate personnel
selections emerged within weeks of the convening of Congress.
Moreover, the Senate rapidly began to assert its powers of advice
and consent rather more vigorously than the framers intended,
blocking a number of lower-level nominees early in the Wash-
ington administration. 61 Thus, the executive's real power with
regard to appointments was quickly compromised.
10 THE FEDERALST No. 77 (A. Hamilton), at 459 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
61 L. ISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
37-38 (1985); Burkoff, supra note 16, at 1342-43. One higher-level nominee whom the
Senate rejected was John Rutledge, President Washington's choice to succeed John Jay
as Chief Justice in 1795. See I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SuPRE?, COURT OF
THE UNITED STATS 1789-1800, at 94-100 (M. Marcus & J. Perry eds. 1985).
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The question whether civil officers could be removed by
means other than impeachment also received an early and prac-
tical answer. Beginning with President Washington, every chief
executive removed at least a few such officials. Once again,
informal mechanisms emerged to modify the system that the
Constitution arguably established. Only later, however, would
serious conflict over the issue erupt between the political
branches .6
2
Formal debate over the removal power took place early in
the First Congress. 63 The issue was joined in connection with
legislation creating the Department of Foreign Affairs, the fore-
runner of today's Department of State. As initially proposed in
the House by James Madison, the department would be headed
by a Secretary selected by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Secretary was "to be removable from
office by the President of the United States." After extended
debate in Committee of the Whole, the House rejected a motion
to delete this language 4 Three days later, following a week-end
recess, the House adopted an amendment providing that the
chief clerk of the department should take charge of its records
"whenever the [Secretary] shall be removed from office by the
President of the United States, or in any other case of va-
cancy. ' 65 Immediately thereafter, the House deleted the clause
that declared the Secretary to be removable by the President. 66
In the Senate, a motion to strike the reference to the President's
power to remove the Secretary was defeated by an equal division,
with Vice-President John Adams casting the decisive vote. 67
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 250 & n.13 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The debate began on May 19, 1789, and continued periodically throughout the
summer. The House debates are set out in I ANAris oF CONG. 368-96, 455-585, 590-91,
611-15 (J. Gales ed. 1789). There is no reliable record of the actual debates in the
Senate.
The Debate of 1789 has been reviewed in detail by a number of scholars. See, e.g.,
E. CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL PowER UNDER THE CONsrrrTnON 10-23 (1927);
L. Fismm, supra note 61, at 61-66; J. HART, TENURE OF OFFIcE UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUrION 217-21, 23940 (1930); C. MORGANSTON, supra note 59, at 15-38; Burkoff, supra
note 16, at 1379-83.
14 1 ANNALs oF CONG. 576 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
Id. at 578-80.
Id. at 585.
A' Myers, 272 U.S. at 115. The Senate considered the matter in secret session.
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Thus, the legislation as passed recognized the possibility that
the President might remove the head of the department but
carefully refrained from stating explicitly that the President could
discharge the Secretary. 8 Representative Benson, who introduced
the amendments ultimately adopted, explained that he wanted
to make clear that the President's removal power arose directly
from the Constitution. The original bill, with its specific provi-
sion that the President could remove the Secretary, might im-
plicitly suggest that the removal power arose only by legislative
grant.
69
Precisely what Congress intended by adopting this formula-
tion remains unclear. Nearly a century and a half later, Chief
Justice Taft would conclude that the First Congress, a virtual
continuation of the Constitutional Convention, 70 had definitively
resolved that the President has unfettered power to remove
executive officers. 71 Others who have reviewed the debates find
the evidence of congressional intent ambiguous indeed. These
observers point out that more than half the members of the
House did not speak during the debate and that no reliable
record of the Senate deliberations exists. Of those members of
the First Congress who did express themselves, only a small
minority believed that the Constitution gave the President such
an illimitable removal power. At least as many thought that
Congress could provide for removal under the necessary and
proper clause,72 and a substantial minority, including several who
had served as delegates to the Constitutional Convention, in-
sisted that the Senate had to consent to removals. Moreover,
some important members, Madison among them, appear to have
taken arguably inconsistent positions during the many weeks of
House consideration of the question.73
There is neither a record of the debate nor complete agreement on the actual tally in
the Senate. See id. n.*; Burkoff, supra note 16, at 1383 n.209.
- Identical language was inserted in the laws creating the Departments of War
and the Treasury. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (War Department);
Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (Treasury Department).
I ANNAis OF CONG. 579 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
70 Myers, 272 U.S. at 136 (noting that the First Congress "numbered among its
leaders those who had been members of the [Constitutional] Convention").
71 Id. at 114.
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
71 Myers, 272 U.S. at 193-99 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 284-86 (Brandeis,
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The so-called Decision of 1789 probably turned as much
upon the nature of the office as upon generally accepted views
about the executive powers vested in the President by article II
of the Constitution. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs was, after
all, the head of the department responsible for conducting the
nation's diplomacy, a field in which the President has always
been accorded broad latitude. The Secretary thus was not only
a close advisor to, but virtually an agent of, the President. 74
Coupled with the almost universal awe in which President Wash-
ington was held, it is hardly surprising that the First Congress
concluded that the Senate need not consent to the removal of
the Secretary. Analogous reasoning would explain the adoption
of the same formulation concerning the Secretary of War, and
probably also the Secretary of the Treasury.75 Whatever the
J., dissenting); E. CORWIN, supra note 63, at 12-16; J. HART, supra note 63, at 217-20,
239-40; Burkoff, supra note 16, at 1384.
Madison in particular took a variety of positions during this debate, although it is
unquestioned that he consistently favored a strong and unitary executive. At the outset,
he opposed deleting the phrase which indicated that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
would be removable by the President. I ANNA.Ls OF CONG. 464 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
Within a few days, however, he voted with the majority to strike that clause. Id. at
585. Moreover, he seconded Representative Benson's successful amendment giving the
chief clerk custody of departmental records "whenever the ... principal officer shall
be removed from office by the President of the United States." Id. at 578-79. The vote
on that proposal immediately preceded the deletion of the clause stating that the President
could remove the Secretary.
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that any particular verbal formulation was generally
understood to embody a commonly accepted construction of the removal power. Sum-
ming up this historical record in Myers, Justice McReynolds incredulously concluded:
It is beyond the ordinary imagination to picture forty or fifty capable
men, presided over by George Washington, vainly discussing, in the heat
of a Philadelphia summer, whether express authority to require opinions
in writing should be delegated to a President in whom they had already
vested the illimitable executive power [of removal] here claimed.
272 U.S. at 207 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
7' E. CORWIN, supra note 63, at 17-18, 22-23; Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 CoLum. L. Rav. 573,
614 (1984).
75 The Secretary of the Treasury, of course, has a limited role in foreign affairs.
Thus, this consideration is less significant as an explanation for this particular removal
provision. Nevertheless, the Secretary is the head of an executive department and as
such is directly responsible to the President. This close relationship to the chief executive
may suffice to explain why Congress adopted the same removal provision for this position
as it did with respect to the others.
An interpretation focusing upon the nature of the office involved, rather than upon
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significance of the decision, however, the participants in the
debate seem to have considered the question as a matter of first
principles. For most of the rest of our history, first principles
have occupied a distinctly secondary place to more mundane
political considerations.
Scarcely a decade later, the removal question returned to
center stage as an integral part of the first true crisis in transition
of national power. President John Adams, defeated in the bitter
campaign of 1800 by Thomas Jefferson, appointed a large num-
ber of Federalists to judicial positions in the waning moments
of his administration.7 6 In the crush of business the night before
Jefferson's inauguration, the commission of William Marbury,
who had been selected to serve as a justice of the peace in the
District of Columbia, was not delivered. Jefferson's Secretary
of State, James Madison, refused to turn over the commission,
thereby preventing Marbury from assuming office. Marbury
thereupon sought an original writ of mandamus from the Su-
preme Court. He argued that President Adams had duly ap-
pointed him to serve for five years and that the new
administration was seeking in effect to remove him from office
prior to the expiration of his term.
The affair was complicated by the central role of John
Marshall. As Secretary of State under Adams, he had signed
Marbury's undelivered commission. Later, Adams appointed
Marshall as Chief Justice. The Jeffersonians, not unreasonably,
viewed these events as evidence that the Federalists had no
intention of relinquishing power despite their repudiation at the
polls. In an effort to prevent what they perceived as a partisan
judiciary from frustrating the will of the people, the new Con-
the view that the power to remove is an inherently executive function, receives some
support from Madison's argument, a week after the final House decision concerning
removal of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the President should not have exclusive
power to dismiss the Comptroller of the Treasury. Madison reasoned that the properties
of that office "partake of a Judiciary quality as well as Executive; perhaps the latter
obtains in the greatest degree." 1 ANNAIs oF CONG. 611-12 (J. Gales ed. 1789). The
cautious reader, however, may discount the force of this argument because Madison's
position did not prevail in the First Congress; the Comptroller of the Treasury, like the
Secretary, was removable by the President.
76 The election of 1800 also revealed an important flaw in the original procedure
for choosing the President. The resulting deadlock, which required 36 ballots in the
House of Representatives to resolve, led directly to the passage of the twelfth amendment.
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gress passed legislation preventing the Supreme Court from sit-
ting between December 1801 and February 1803. In the end,
however, that legislation could not preempt a decision in the
politically charged case of Marbury v. Madison.
77
Marshall's decision in Marbury is best known, of course, for
establishing the power of judicial review. It ultimately concluded
that Congress could not, consistent with article III, expand the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction; the provision of the Ju-
diciary Act of 178978 purporting to do so thus was unconstitu-
tional. Since the Court had no power to issue an original writ
of mandamus, Marbury could not prevail.
79
In reaching this conclusion, Marshall addressed two impor-
tant questions concerning the respective roles of the President
and Congress in appointments and removals. First, he noted
that, under the Constitution, appointment is a presidential act,
"though it can only be performed by and with the advice and
consent of the senate." 80 While this statement is dictum in the
context of the case at hand, it suggests that quite early in our
political history authoritative support existed for resolving the
ambiguities in the appointments clause in favor of the Presi-
dent.8'
Second, and of more immediate relevance, Marshall wrote
that Marbury did not serve at the mere whim of the President.
Rather, the law creating the position gave Marbury the right to
hold his office "for five years, independent of the executive."
8 2
Thus, because Adams had made the appointment, Jefferson was
powerless to revoke it during Marbury's statutory term. This,
too, is dictum in the context of the case. Moreover, entirely
apart from its byzantine political background, Marbury arose in
an unusual factual setting. A justice of the peace is a judicial
" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For further details on the background to this
controversy, see 3 A. BEVERMIGE, THE Li-E OF JOHN MARSHALL 94-97 (1919); 2 C.
WARREN, TBn SUtPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 222-23 (rev. ed. 1937); Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 3-6.
1.1 Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81.
7 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-80.
'Id. at 155.
,' Cf. Myers, 272 U.S. at 142 (remarking that even a dictum of Chief Justice
Marshall "challenges the highest and most respectful consideration").
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162.
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officer, and in any event the Constitution authorizes Congress
to legislate with respect to the District of Columbia.8 3 Neverthe-
less, the statement implies that in certain circumstances Congress
might restrict the President's right to remove federal officers. 4
Therefore, the Decision of 1789 may not have conclusively de-
termined that the Constitution gives the President unfettered
authority to discharge.
The next great battle over the removal power erupted in
1833. Andrew Jackson had come into office as an outspoken
exponent of the spoils system. As such, he dismissed an unprec-
edented number of government workers, replacing them with his
own supporters.8 5 The controversy over Jackson's removal pol-
icies came to a head when he directed Secretary of the Treasury
William Duane to withdraw all federal funds from the Bank of
the United States. The Bank question had been a central issue
in American politics for many years,8 and Jackson had been a
principal opponent of such an institution. Jackson fired Duane
for refusing to move the government's money to state banks.
During a congressional recess, the President named Roger Taney
as acting Secretary of the Treasury; Taney promptly complied
with Jackson's order. When the Senate reconvened, it refused
to confirm Taney's appointment and passed a resolution censur-
ing President Jackson.8 7 Cooler heads prevailed, and the reso-
lution was rescinded three years later.88
In retrospect, all sides seem to have won at least a partial
victory: Jackson got the government's money out of the Bank,
and the Senate prevented what it viewed as an excessively com-
pliant nominee from taking command over the Treasury. In
practical terms, however, the executive came out slightly ahead:
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
4 Accord E. CORWIN, supra note 63, at 27-28.
85 In fact, although Jackson terminated more officials than all his predecessors
combined, his rhetoric was considerably more sweeping than his actions. Nevertheless,
his approach represented a substantial break with tradition. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 250-
51 n.13, 252 n.16 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); L. FiSHER, supra note 61, at 67; Develop-
ments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1611, 1624-26 (1984).
11 Recall that a state's attempt to impose taxes upon the first Bank precipitated
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
87 See L. FisHER, supra note 61, at 67-68; J. HART, supra note 63, at 223-30; C.
MORGANSTON, supra note 59, at 48-61; Burkoff, supra note 16, at 1386-87.
11 13 CONG. DEB. 379-418, 427-506 (1837).
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the President had rid himself of an uncooperative cabinet mem-
ber, but the Senate found itself unable to reinstate the ousted
official. Still, this round in the legal debate over the removal
power ended inconclusively.
The continuing friction over removal eventually prompted
Congress to legislate on the subject. During the debate generated
by the Duane affair, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and John
Calhoun all urged that removals could be regulated by statute. 89
In fact, Congress had taken a tentative step in that direction in
1820, when it limited the terms of various appointed officials to
four years but provided that they should be removable "at
pleasure." 9 The "pleasure" was generally understood to be the
President's. 91
Not until 1863, when the spoils system had been in full
operation for a generation, did Congress formally provide for a
legislative role in removals. The Currency Act fixed the term of
the Comptroller at "five years unless sooner removed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 92
President Lincoln signed this bill into law without objecting to
this clause. 9
.' See E. CORWiN, supra note 63, at 30-31; J. HART, supra note 63, at 223-30; C.
MOROANSTON, supra note 59, at 50-56, 58-59.
' ' Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 102, § 1, 3 Stat. 582. This statute applied to all
federal district attorneys, customs collectors, registers of land offices, and various
positions in the military.
Both before and after 1820, Congress also enacted a series of narrower laws relating
to inferior civil offices. Some of these provisions fixed the term during which incumbents
might retain their positions, while others specified grounds for removal. See generally
Myers, 272 U.S. at 210-14 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 250-56 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
., Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?,
124 U. PA. L. REv. 942, 950 (1976).
'2 Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665.
A Myers, 272 U.S. at 252 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Presidents generally have signed removal statutes which limit their power to dis-
charge federal officers. The significance of this fact is not altogether clear. Presidents
often sign legislation containing objectionable features because they believe, on balance,
that the positive aspects of the bill outweigh the negative. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law:
Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. Rv.
1064, 1089 & n.74 (1981). The Currency Act signed by President Lincoln is an especially
apt example of this phenomenon. It was adopted at the height of the Civil War, when
there was understandable urgency about the nation's economic affairs.
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This provision would be carried over to the Tenure of Office
Act,94 adopted over President Andrew Johnson's veto at a time
of extraordinary conflict over Reconstruction policies. Originally
drafted to protect rank-and-file federal workers from a wave of
firings in late 1866, the bill was quickly broadened to insulate
members of the cabinet, especially Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton, from dismissal as well. 95 The Act assured that cabinet
members would hold office during the term of the President
who appointed them and for one month afterward unless the
Senate ratified their discharge sooner; other civil officers whose
appointment required Senate confirmation would retain their
positions until that body approved their successors. 96 Violation
of the Act was a high misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not
more than $10,000, imprisonment for not more than five years,
or both.
97
The predictable collision was not long in coming. Johnson
promptly removed Stanton from office without Senate approval,
a step which precipitated his impeachment. Ten of the eleven
counts in the bill of impeachment related to this statutory vio-
lation. Johnson was acquitted in the Senate by a one-vote mar-
gin, and the entire affair came to be viewed as a national
embarrassment. 98
1 Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat.
6, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
R. BERGER, ImPEAcHmENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRoBLEMs 260-63, 274-80 (1973);
E. McKrrRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 495-97 (1960).
9 Section 2 of the Act further provided that, during a recess of the Senate, the
President might suspend and designate a temporary successor for any officer who had
become incapable of or legally disqualified from performing his duties. within 20 days
after the Senate reconvened, however, the President had to report the fact of and the
grounds for removal to that body. Unless the Senate approved the removal, the sus-
pended official would resume his position.
In addition, section 3 limited the President's power to make recess appointments
as a device to circumvent Senate hostility to executive policies. This provision allowed
the President to fill vacancies that occurred during a congressional recess. If the chief
executive failed to send up a nomination during the Senate's next regular session, the
position would remain unfilled until that body confirmed an appointee.
17 Tenure of Office Act § 6, 14 Stat. 430, 431.
See generally M. BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
(1973); R. BERGER, supra note 95, at 252-96; D. DEWrrr, Tm hiPsEAc sNT AND TRuAL
OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1903); E. McKTRiCK, supra note 95, at 486-509; Burkoff, supra
note 16, at 1388-93.
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Congress responded by amending the Tenure of Office Act
in the first weeks of the incoming Grant administration. The
new version deleted the specific provision applicable to cabinet
members and liberalized the procedures for suspensions and
recess appointments." Despite continuing criticism, the Act was
not repeated until 1887. The end came during the first Demo-
cratic administration in twenty-four years, following a bitter
wrangle between President Cleveland and the Senate over the
wholesale removal of federal employees. 100
For all the controversy it had generated, the law went out
with barely a whimper. The House allocated just half an hour
to the issue; the report accompanying the bill had only one
substantive paragraph. 0' The Senate spent longer on the bill,
but only because Senator George Edmunds of Vermont, one of
the few remaining members who had served in the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses, protested that the Act stood as a bulwark
against the abuses of the spoils system. 0 2 Edmunds' concerns
have a curious ring to them; four years earlier Congress had
passed the Pendleton Act, 03 the first comprehensive federal civil
service law, in an effort to address that very problem.
Edmunds' narrow perspective during this debate was hardly
unique. Not a single member of either chamber pointed out that
a separate tenure of office provision applied to postmasters.
104
Nor did anyone remark that, barely a month before, Congress
had created the nation's first administrative agency with a pro-
" Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6. See L. FiSHER, supra note 61, at 69; J.
HART, supra note 63, at 230-33.
'" See L. FISHER, supra note 61, at 70; C. MoRoANsToN, supra note 59, at 74-80.
The entire House consideration of the repeal measure appears at 18 CONG. R c.
2697-700 (1887). The relevant portion of the report states:
The reasons for the ... recommendation are, that by the repeal of
[the Tenure of Office Act], the law will then stand as it stood from the
foundation of the Government up to 1867, when, in a time of great party
excitement, the said legislation was enacted, which, to say the least, was
unusual and tended to embarrass the President in the exercise of his
constitutional prerogative.
H.R. REP. No. 3539, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1887).
"12 18 CoNa. REc. 137, 138-40, 141, 211-14 (1886); see also supra text accompanying
note 95.
Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403.
Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80. See infra Part III.A.
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vision that its members might be removed only for "inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. °105 Eventually, how-
ever, the Supreme Court would attempt to resolve the long-
standing political controversy over removal in cases involving
those very provisions.
C. Judicial Precedents
Despite the legal questions raised by these episodes, the
Supreme Court managed to steer relatively clear of the removal
controversy until well into the twentieth century. Although it
heard the claims of a number of ousted officials, the Court
studiously avoided resolution of the constitutional issues while
filling its opinions with dicta. By means of a variety of tempor-
izing devices, almost every challenge was rejected. Over time,
however, the Court began to hint that removal might not be an
exclusive executive prerogative.
The circumlocutions of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury
set the early pattern of judicial treatment of the ultimate con-
stitutional issue. 10 6 By 1839, in Ex parte Hennen,'07 the Court
was suggesting that the Decision of 1789 had established that
the removal power belonged to the President alone.los Yet the
facts giving rise to this dictum were considerably more limited.
All that Hennen actually resolved was that, because the power
of removal followed from the power of appointment, a federal
district judge who had been authorized to hire a court clerk had
a unilateral right to fire the clerk.1 9
"Is Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887) (current version
at 49 U.S.C. § 10301(c) (1982)). See infra Part III.B. (discussing judicial construction
of identical language in another statute).
This provision appears to have attracted virtually no attention during the congres-
sional debates on the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Indeed, the
subject of removal is not even mentioned in standard discussions of the legislative history
of the Commerce Act. See, e.g., A. & 0. HooomENooM, A HISTORY oF THE ICC 13-17
(1976); 1 1. SHARThAN, Tit INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMssON 19-35 (1931). To the
extent that it had any significance, the language seems to have been intended to assure
that objectionable commissioners would be dismissed rather than to assert congressional
authority over removals. See R. CusmAN, supra note 16, at 61-62.
106 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
107 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
"I Id. at 259.
101 Id. at 258-59. In this instance the clerk was discharged by the successor of the
judge who had appointed him.
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For the next half-century, the Court upheld dismissals and
suspensions on a variety of theories. Sometimes the justices
found a lack of jurisdiction to order the sought-after remedy,
which invariably was back pay. 110 On other occasions, the Court
narrowly construed the statute upon which the suit was based
to reject the claim."' Senate confirmation of a successor also
was held to defeat any possible relief for ousted officials." 2
The only exception to this pattern was United States v.
Perkins,' which assured the constitutionality of the civil service
laws. Significantly, however, that case concerned a dismissal by
a department head, not by the President. In Perkins, the Court
held that, in the absence of a specific statutory provision, the
Secretary of the Navy had no inherent authority to discharge a
cadet engineer from the service. The engineer, a graduate of the
Naval Academy, had been appointed under a statute that ap-
peared to assure him a position for a definite term. The Secretary
had discharged him because there were no vacancies at the
time."14 The Court reasoned that the engineer held an inferior
office, appointments to which had been vested in the Secretary
as head of an executive department. The statute vesting the
Secretary with authority to appoint did not expressly confer a
power to terminate. Accordingly, Congress "may limit and re-
strict the power of removal as it deems best for the public
interest.""' 5 The opinion carefully avoided deciding whether
', United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 303-05 (1855)
(finding no jurisdiction to order payment of back salary to chief justice of Minnesota
Territory whom President had removed before end of statutory term).
The dissent in this case made clear that the definition of "appointment" in article
II still had not been entirely settled. Despite Chief Justice Marshall's statement in
Marbury over 50 years earlier, Justice McLean insisted that, "[i]f the power to remove
from office be inferred from the power to appoint, both the elements of the appointing
power [i.e., nomination by President and confirmation by Senate] are necessarily in-
cluded." Id. at 307 (McLean, J., dissenting).
- McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891) (denying claim for back salary
by territorial judge removed before expiration of his term); Embry v. United States, 100
U.S. 680, 684-85 (1880) (refusing to award back pay to suspended postmaster because
1869 Tenure of Office Act, under which case arose, permitted denial of salary during
periods of suspension).
M Mullan v. United States, 140 U.S. 240, 245-47 (1891); Blake v. United States,
103 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1881).





Congress might restrict the President's power to remove officials
whom he had appointed with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 116 Nonetheless, Perkins made clear that Congress could
create a civil service system simply by vesting the power to
appoint federal workers in department heads and limiting, re-
stricting, or regulating removals. Thus, the spoils system could
be effectively abolished by statute.
The Court returned to the problem of statutory restrictions
on removal in a series of cases around the turn of the century.
First, it held that a statute providing a four-year term for United
States Attorneys did not prevent the President frorh dismissing
an incumbent during that period; the law in question was de-
signed simply to make explicit that holders of such positions did
not have life tenure." 7 Next, the Court held that, in the absence
of a specific statutory provision, a Department of the Interior
clerk could not obtain judicial review of his dismissal for inef-
ficiency."
8
A year later, a United States Commissioner was denied back
pay after being summarily discharged by the territorial judge
who had appointed him. The statute creating the position made
the commissioner removable "for causes prescribed by law."
Because Congress had failed to prescribe grounds for removal,
the judge had unreviewable discretion to terminate the commis-
sioner. The Court cautioned, however, that the case would have
been "much different" if Congress had legislated to fill the
statutory gap."19
The last of the eaily cases, Shurtleff v. United States, 20 also
upheld a presidential dismissal. The decision is significant be-
cause it explicitly recognized the possibility that Congress might
restrict the grounds for removal of federal officers to those
specified by statute, although the Court did so "for purposes of
"I Id. at 484.
"1 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 338-39, 342-43 (1897).
The political aspects of this case were palpable. Parsons had been appointed by
President Benjamin Harrison and was removed by President Cleveland, who had defeated
Harrison in the 1892 election.
"I Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 294 (1900).
,9 Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 424-25, 427 (1901).
1- 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
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this case only."' 2 President McKinley had summarily terminated
Shurtleff as a general appraiser of merchandise, although the
law under which he had been appointed provided that he could
"be removed from office at any time by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."'122 The
Court nonetheless upheld the discharge, reasoning that it "would
require very clear and explicit language" to assume that Congress
had intended to limit the President's undoubted right to remove,
as incident to his power to appoint, and that the statute in
question did not satisfy this demanding standard.' 23
In each of these decisions, the Court carefully hedged so as
to avoid resolving the constitutional question. The justices seemed
to recognize the intractable political aspects of the removal de-
bate. Thus, at least where the President had made the dismissal
personally, the Court consistently declined to intervene. Its opin-
ions implied that Congress might limit the chief executive's
freedom of action, but every statute that might have been so
construed was read very narrowly against the terminated official.
Even where someone else had taken the challenged action, the
Court was reluctant to interfere. Except for finding no consti-
tutional impediment to the creation of the merit system, the
justices deemed the matter as one best left to the political
branches.
M Id. at 314.
,22 Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (emphasis added). This
language is identical to the grounds for removal set out in the Interstate Commerce Act.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
12' 189 U.S. at 315.
The Court also emphasized that Shurtleff essentially was asserting a right to life
tenure because the statute did not fix a definite term of appointment. It was "quite
inadmissible" to infer a congressional intent to confer such tenure on so lowly an officer
absent "plain and explicit language" to that effect because such a construction would
overturn more than 100 years of practice. Id. at 316. See infra note 195.
This point does not undermine the validity of the civil service laws, however. Unlike
civil servants, who as "inferior officers" are appointed by department heads alone,
general appraisers such as Shurtleff were appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Congress undoubtedly could have vested the appointment of such




III. TBE SuPREME COURT'S PROPOSED RESOLUTION
A. The Myers Decision
After that extended prologue, the Supreme Court finally
attempted to impose order on the conflict between the political
branches in 1926. In Myers v. United States,24 the Court de-
clared unconstitutional a statute that required the advice and
consent of the Senate for the removal of most postmasters. Not
content to let the matter rest there, the majority, speaking through
Chief Justice Taft, gratuitously went on retroactively to invali-
date the long-repealed Tenure of Office Act' 25 and to maintain
that any limitation upon the President's power to discharge his
appointees violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. The ex-
traordinary breadth of Taft's argument prompted three separate
dissents. 126
The "unusual length and elaborateness"' 27 of the opinions
should have come as no surprise. Long before the decision was
announced, it was clear that Myers was a "great case.'1 2  It had
been argued twice in the Supreme Court; on reargument the
Court invited Senator George Wharton Pepper as amicus curiae
' 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
12 Id. at 176. This was not the only time that the Court went out of its way to
condemn, as unconstitutional, a discredited but no longer effective statute. In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964), the Court found the Sedition Act
of 1798, which had expired by its own terms in 1801, violated the first amendment.
'16 Justice Holmes found the premises of the opinion "spider's webs inadequate to
control the dominant facts." 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting). While Holmes
managed to compress his unease into three paragraphs, Justice McReynolds delivered a
somewhat meandering 62-page critique, id. at 178-239 (McReynolds, J., dissenting), and
Justice Brandeis devoted 56 pages to tracing virtually the entire history of the removal
controversy, particularly as it related to inferior officers, id. at 240-95 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
'z Strauss, supra note 74, at 610.
m Although Myers might support Holmes' famous aphorism that "[g]reat cases
like hard cases make bad law," Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting), there was no such suggestion in the opinions. Perhaps
even the dissenters recognized that if the observation were correct, "the Court must
make a lot of bad law." Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even
When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 26 (1971); cf. Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802, 805-07 (1982) (suggesting that the Court
is being called upon to decide an increasing number of hard cases).
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to present the views of Congress. Despite the retrospective sig-
nificance of the decision, almost everything about the Myers
litigation has an air of unreality about it.
Let us begin with the facts.129 In 1913, Frank Myers was
appointed to a four-year term as postmaster in Portland, Ore-
gon, by President Wilson. Wilson reappointed Myers for a sim-
ilar term in 1917. In the latter half of 1919, postal inspectors
conducted an investigation into possible irregularities in the Port-
land post office. In January 1920, the Postmaster General de-
manded that Myers resign. When Myers refused, he was removed
from office effective February 1, 1920. Although the correspond-
ence between Myers and officials of the Post Office Department
referred to the investigation, no reason was given for the firing.
Assuming that there were grounds to dismiss Myers, 30 the
sacking was handled in a most curious fashion. The statute under
which he had been appointed provided:
Postmasters of the first, second and third classes shall be
appointed and may be removed by the President by and with
11, The facts are summarized in Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court. 272
U.S. at 106-07. The transcript of the record (including the Court of Claims decision
under review), the briefs on reargument in the Supreme Court, and the various opinions
of the justices were later published by the Government Printing Office. POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT TO REmovE FEDERAL OFICERS, S. Doc. No. 174, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1926).
Except as otherwise indicated, the account of the facts in the text is taken from the
latter document. Id. at 5-17.
121 The nature of the irregularities which prompted the investigation is unclear. I
have been unable to locate anything that might shed light on the subject. Neither the
record in the case nor anything in the popular or scholarly literature amplifies the
circumstances surrounding the investigation. The New York Times, which reported the
Supreme Court decision on the front page, did not explain why Myers had been fired.
The files of the Portland Oregonian for the relevant period are in inaccessible storage,
so it is impossible to determine what the local press may have reported. Academic
historians also appear to have overlooked the Myers case. I have found no relevant
articles and not a single reference to the affair in any of the numerous biographies of
President Wilson that I have consulted.
The letter demanding Myers' resignation referred to the need "to eliminate the
antagonism which existed in the Portland post office and bring about needed coopera-
tion." Letter from First Assistant Postmaster General J.C. Koons to F.S. Myers, Jan.
22, 1920, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 174, supra note 129, at 7. The implication of an
unusual degree of friction between Myers and his subordinates at the Portland post
office suggests that he was removed on administrative grounds. In any event, there is
no reason to doubt that at least colorable grounds for the action against Myers could
have been adduced had the occasion required.
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the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold their
offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended
according to law. 3'
Myers was a first-class postmaster. Despite the plain language
of the statute, President Wilson declined to seek Senate approval
for the ouster of Myers. He also failed to nominate a replace-
ment for Myers until after Congress adjourned six months later.
Precisely why President Wilson proceeded in this fashion
remains unclear. 132 He could have complied with the require-
ments of the statute by simply nominating a new postmaster for
Portland.' 33 There was no particular reason to believe that the
Senate would have rejected such a person, especially if the
investigation of Myers had found any substance to the allega-
tions of irregularities in his operation. 134
"I Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80-81. This section essentially
reenacted a previous requirement of Senate consent to the removal of postmasters that
had been adopted four years earlier. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 63, 17 Stat. 283,
292-93.
It is not altogether clear why Congress felt it necessary to legislate special protection
for postmasters. These officials, after all, were included within the coverage of the
Tenure of Office Act. The question takes on special force because postmasters of the
first, second, and third classes constituted nearly 90 percent of all presidential appointees
as late as 1923. See 272 U.S. at 241 n.3 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The answer seems to
be that these postal statutes were passed to create exceptions to the Tenure of Office
Act. The 1872 law created five classes of postmasters, while the 1876 law established
four. Thus, each of these enactments exempted the heads of the smallest post offices
from the requirement of Senate consent to removal.
12 As indicated earlier, published works covering this period shed no light on this
aspect of the affair. See supra note 130. Further, nothing in the heretofore published
Wilson papers addresses this episode. At this writing, however, this enormous project,
directed by Arthur S. Link for the Princeton University Press, has not progressed beyond
the end of 1919. Perhaps the unpublished materials contain evidence bearing upon the
question.
"I Myers' counsel conceded that point in the Supreme Court. 272 U.S. at 59.
Wilson might have been unwilling to face the prospect that Myers would demand
to testify at the confirmation hearing for a successor. Myers in fact had asked the
chairman of the Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads to hold a hearing
on his case within three weeks of his ouster. S. Doc. No. 174, supra note 129, at 8, 15.
This problem hardly seems serious, however, particularly if cause existed for Myers'
removal.
,34 It is conceivable that the widespread unhappiness with the aggressive policies
and personality of Postmaster General Burleson might have prompted some opposition
in the Senate. See W. WEaIs, WLSON =Ha UNKNowN 313 (1931). Although the Repub-
licans held a narrow majority in the upper chamber, it is difficult to assess the likelihood
that this opposition would have been more than nominally troublesome.
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Two explanations for Wilson's conduct come readily to mind.
First, although the President was said to have approved the
order to fire Myers, he may not in fact have been familiar with
the details of the situation. At the time of Myers' ouster, Wilson
had been bedridden for more than four months after suffering
a stroke early in the fall of 1919. His physical condition pre-
vented him from performing many of the duties of his office.
Therefore, it is entirely possible that Postmaster General Burle-
son decided to fire Myers and Wilson merely ratified the dis-
missal pro forma.135
This hypothesis, however, fails to explain why the adminis-
tration opted to provoke a constitutional challenge over a minor
personnel matter. For that, one must look to the domestic po-
litical situation at the time. Wilson had suffered his stroke in
the midst of a nationwide speaking tour designed to enlist pop-
ular support for the Treaty of Versailles, and especially for the
League of Nations Covenant which was its centerpiece, against
the "little band of willful men" in the Senate who had been
blocking ratification. Wilson regarded the League as the single
highest priority for the remainder of his term, an instrument he
hoped would render war obsolete and incidentally assure his
place in history. The unexpectedly strong opposition to the League
threatened his supreme objective. Thus, the Senate's perceived
interference with the realization of this cherished dream may
have made Wilson especially sensitive to any legislative incursion
upon executive powers.
36
Unfortunately, no hard evidence exists to support this hy-
pothesis. Yet only such an explanation could account for a
presidential decision to transform a routine administrative prob-
lem into a constitutional confrontation. Moreover, this expla-
'" See J. KERNEY, THE PoLmcAL EDUCATION OF WOODROW WILSON 432-33 (1926);
D. LAwRENCE, THnE TRUE STORY OF WOODROW WILSoN 282 (1924); G. VIERECK, THE
STRANGEsT FRIENDsmP IN HISTORY 320 (1932).
1;" It was probably only coincidence that one of the Democratic supporters of the
Lodge reservations to the Treaty of Versailles was Senator George E. Chamberlain of
Oregon. See D. LAwRENCE, supra note 135, at 296. While there may have been some
satisfaction in getting back at a patronage appointee in the home state of a Senate
renegade, it is unlikely that Wilson was involved enough in daily decisionmaking to have




nation would be consistent with Wilson's adamant defense of
presidential prerogative that led him to veto the original Budget
and Accounting Act in the spring of 1920.137 Finally, the esca-
lation of such a trivial incident into a question of high principle
might suggest that the decision was made out of petulance or
emotional instability, conditions which appear to have charac-
terized much of Wilson's behavior during this period.
3 8
Whatever the reason, Myers continually asserted his right to
remain in office. Soon after his term expired during the summer
of 1921, he filed suit for his unpaid salary. The Court of Claims
denied his claim on grounds of laches,'3 9 a basis that even the
government could not defend.'40 Thus, the constitutional issue
was joined.
Chief Justice Taft found support for his view that the Pres-
ident had unfettered power to remove any of his appointees
(except article III judges, who are specifically assured life tenure
during good behavior) from the Constitution's establishment of
a unitary executive and from the President's responsibility under
article II to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ' '
4'
That responsibility required that the President have subordinates
to assist him and that he be able to discharge them whenever he
loses confidence in their character or fitness. 142 This was the true
import of the debate in the First Congress, 143 congressional prac-
tice down to the Tenure of Office Act suggesting acquiescence
in unlimited presidential removal authority,'14 the views of such
respected constitutional authorities as Kent, Story, and Webs-
ter, 145 and the prior decisions of the Court./46 The experience
137 See infra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
,31 See, e.g., J. BLUM, vOODROW wILSON AND THE POLrnCS OF MoitirrA 191-95
(1956); D. LAWRENCE, supra note 135, at 282.
"I Myers v. United States, 58 Ct. C1. 199, 206 (1923), aff'd on other grounds, 272
U.S. 52 (1926).
,40 As Chief Justice Taft delicately put it, "[T]he Solicitor General, while not
formally confessing error in this respect, conceded at the bar that no laches had been
shown." 272 U.S. at 107.
.. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
141 272 U.S. at 117.
141 Id. at 109-36.
'" Id. at 145-48.
14 Id. at 148-52.
146 Id. at 152-58. Taft also invoked several opinions of attorneys general that were
consistent with this position.
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under the Tenure of Office Act amply confirmed the dangers of
allowing legislative encroachment upon presidential preroga-
tives.147 In response to Myers' argument that this case concerned
an inferior officer, Taft observed that Congress could have
vested the appointment in the Postmaster General accompanied
by limitations upon grounds for removal; not having done so,
however, the legislature had left the President with a free hand
to dismiss for any reason or for none.148
For all its breadth, the opinion seems to have reasoned
backward from a radical separation-of-powers perspective. The
Chief Justice emphasized that "the reasonable construction of
the Constitution must be that the branches should be kept sep-
arate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and
the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more
than it affirmatively requires. ' 149 For Taft, the heads of depart-
ments were virtual surrogates for the President, exercising his
judgment and therefore requiring his implicit faith. There was
no principled basis for distinguishing these superior officers from
their subordinates. 50 Thus, removal was an inherently executive
function that could not be shared. He grudgingly conceded that
some executive officers might be charged with making quasi-
judicial determinations requiring insulation from direct presiden-
tial influence or control, but even then the chief executive could
"consider the decision after its rendition as a reason for remov-
ing the officer, on the ground that the discretion regularly en-
trusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole
intelligently or wisely exercised." '
Logical difficulties abound in this opinion. At the most basic
level, it offered no support for the proposition that removal is
an inherently executive function. Taft curtly dismissed the co-
lonial and early state practice of lodging removals in the legis-
lature or the judiciary as "really vesting part of the executive
power in another branch of the Government. ' 152 This entirely
14 Id. at 164-68.
-' Id. at 163.
" Id. at 116.
"' Id. at 132-34.
" Id. at 135.
M Id. at 118.
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circular statement thus begged the central question in the case.'
Moreover, why anyone would regard an illimitable removal
power as a significant presidential prerogative is difficult to
understand in light of the ease with which Congress can circum-
vent it. The opinion made plain that the legislative branch could
limit the President's role in, or perhaps even exclude him alto-
gether from, dismissing so-called inferior officers by the simple
device of vesting their appointments in the heads of depart-
ments. 15 4 Further, nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress
from fixing salaries at levels so low that government officials
would resign,'5 5 or even from abolishing some positions out-
right.5 6 Plainly implied, then, was the dubious proposition that
the Constitution itself somehow enshrined the spoils system for
every nonjudicial appointive office.
157
Passing these difficulties, however, the evidence supporting
Taft's expansive construction of executive power was not per-
suasive, as the dissenters and the commentators immediately
noted. 158 First, the Decision of 1789 did not seem nearly as broad
as the Chief Justice painted it.'- 9 Second, Congress had imposed
" At a logically prior level, the opinion also assumes that the power of appointment
is an executive prerogative, limited only by the requirement of the advice and consent
of the Senate. The Constitution, however, lends credence to the alternative view that
the appointment power is shared. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. None-
theless, a settled practical consensus seems to have arisen in favor of the construction
that the Chief Justice endorsed. This judicial construction can be traced at least as far
back as Marbury. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The last time any
member of the Court seriously suggested that the appointment power is shared took
place in 1855, see supra note 110, perhaps indicating the aptness of Holmes' aphorism
that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
114 See supra text accompanying note 148.
"I Only federal judges have constitutional salary protection, and even that provision
prevents only reductions in pay. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. As the recent concern over
judicial compensation suggests, however, simply leaving pay scales unadjusted may
discourage some qualified persons from seeking government employment.
"1 See 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11 See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of
the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the
Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PoBs., Spring 1976, at 102, 114-15.
"" Indeed, Professors Corwin and Hart wrote their works specifically to rebut the
broad arguments in the Myers opinion. See generally E. CORWIN, supra note 63; J.
HART, supra note 63.
119 See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
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numerous statutory limitations upon the President's power to
remove inferior officers such as postmasters. 160 Third, the con-
stitutional authorities whom Taft invoked did not endorse his
far-reaching interpretation of the removal power; Story, in par-
ticular, suggested that Congress could require Senate consent for
the removal of inferior officers.' 61 Fourth, the judicial prece-
dents, while upholding each challenged removal by the President,
contained language implying that executive authority in this field
might not be unlimited. 62 Finally, Taft dismissed Hamilton's
argument in The Federalist No. 77 on the basis of an ambiguous
statement made in an entirely different context several years
later 63 and rejected Marshall's Marbury opinion as mere dic-
tum, 64 even though this evidence suggested that the original
understanding of the removal power was not as clear as the
Myers majority now claimed.
Most commentators explain the broad sweep of the opinion
by Taft's unique status as the only member of the Supreme
Court ever to have occupied the White House. 65 Yet this fact
raises one last ironic question about the opinion: if the require-
ment of senatorial consent for the removal of postmasters truly
were an intolerable infringement upon executive power, how did
Taft himself manage to ignore it during his four years in the
presidency? The statute had been on the books for more than
forty years when he took office. As President, Taft dismissed
scores of postmasters. In each instance he scrupulously complied
160 See 272 U.S. at 188-92, 209-15 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (noting that the
President lacked authority to appoint, much less to remove, postmasters until 1836); id.
at 250-56, 259-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); J. HART, supra note 63, at 230-33.
"' J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1544 (1833), quoted in 272
U.S. at 240 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). On the other authorities relied upon by Taft, see
E. CORM9N, supra note 63, at 28-31.
,,2 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
'" 272 U.S. at 136-39; see E. CoRwIN, supra note 63, at 25-26.
'' 272 U.S. at 139-43; see E. CoRwiN, supra note 63, at 27.
See, e.g., E. CORnWIN, supra note 63, at 50; Bruff, Presidential Power and
Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 476 (1979); Burkoff, supra note 16, at
1402-04; Donovan & Irvine, The President's Power to Remove Members of Administra-
tive Agencies, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 221 (1936); Leuchtenburg, The Case of the
Contentious Commissioner: Humphreys' [sic] Executor v. U.S., in FREEDOM AND REFORM
276, 292 (H. Hyman & L. Levy eds. 1967); Strauss, supra note 74, at 610.
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with the law that he found so obnoxious in Myers.16 He never
questioned the constitutionality of the statute, even when the
Senate blocked the removal of some postmasters. 167 The events
in Myers suggest that he easily could have created a test case
had he been so inclined.
This question takes on added force when one considers that
Taft thought that the President should not even have to bother
appointing postmasters and other minor officials. As he ex-
plained during the interlude between his presidency and his chief
justiceship:
I cannot exaggerate the waste of the President's time and
the consumption of his nervous vitality involved in listening to
Congressmen's intercession as to local appointments. Why
should the President have his time taken up in a discussion
over the question who shall be postmistress at the town of
Devil's Lake in North Dakota?
168
6 An incomplete search of government documents reveals that President Taft
sought to remove at least 175 postmasters during his term. He did so by submitting the
name of the replacement to the Senate for its approval. See, e.g., 48 CoNG. RIc. 9239
(1912) (seeking consent to remove postmasters in Illinois, Kentucky, and Minnesota); 45
CONG. REc. 62 (1909) (seeking consent to remove postmasters in Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, and West Virginia). Senate confirmation of the replacement
necessarily constituted advice and consent to the removal of the incumbent.
1'7 When the Senate failed to act on proposed removals, Taft invariably resubmitted
the name of the replacement. Consider the example of Frank E. Britton. Taft sought to
oust him as postmaster of Jonesboro, Tennessee, by nominating James S. Byrd for the
position. 47 CONG. REc. 54 (1911). The Senate did not vote on the Byrd nomination
before adjournment. When Congress reconvened, Taft proposed Byrd once more. 48
CONG. RiEc. 86 (1911). This time the Senate confirmed the appointment, which resulted
in the discharge of Britton. 48 CoNG. REc. 2775 (1912).
On one occasion, however, Taft's persistence proved unavailing. He tried three
times to remove John G. Gorth as postmaster of Oconomowoc, Wisconsin. 46 CONG.
REc. 73 (1910); 47 CONG. REc. 54 (1911); 48 CONG. REc. 87 (1911). The Senate never
voted on the nomination of W.A. Jones to replace Gorth. At no time did Taft object
to this legislative frustration of his personnel preferences.
163 W. TAr, OuR CHmF MAGISTRATE "D His Pow Rs 67 (1916). See also id. at
60-61 (suggesting that the requirement of Senate confirmation of postmasters had intro-
duced unfortunate political considerations into the post office). Significantly, Taft does
not mention the statutory requirement of Senate consent for the removal of postmasters
anywhere in this discussion.
It is, of course, true that lawyers generally accord little interpretive value to such
extrajudicial statements. In this instance, however, they serve as a counterweight to
Taft's own quotation from John Marshall's biography of George Washington to blunt
the force of awkward dicta in Marbury concerning the limits of the President's removal
power. See 272 U.S. at 143-44.
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Indeed, Taft had urged that the President be required to appoint
only members of the cabinet and a single undersecretary in each
department. All other executive personnel, including assistant
secretaries and bureau chiefs, would be civil servants with "per-
manent tenure."' 169 It seems almost impossible to reconcile this
extraordinarily narrow view of presidential appointment power
with the emphasis in Myers upon the President's absolute need
to command the unquestioned fidelity of all subordinates, a
need so essential to sound government that the chief executive
must have the unfettered right to discharge each subordinate at
any time and for any reason.
The answer to this intriguing question seems to be that Taft
was what the British call a King's-party man, a person who
ascribes unique wisdom to the head of state, simply by virtue
of occupancy of that exalted position. A King's-party man be-
lieves that only the head of state is capable of discharging the
powers and duties of the office and therefore should not have
to suffer interference with sovereign prerogatives.170 Long before
his presidency-indeed, thirty-five years before his Myers opin-
ion-Taft, as Solicitor General, had argued publicly and pri-
vately for an expansive view of executive authority over
removals.'17 But Taft was an ambivalent King's-party man; be-
cause he despised the give and take of mundane political affairs,
"' W. TAFT, supra note 168, at 70-71.
'~ See E. DREw, supra note 13, at 47, 397.
'7 Taft had argued successfully in favor of broad presidential removal power in
one of the earlier cases. McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 175 (1891). There is
a delicious irony about Taft's involvement in this case: he based his entire argument in
support of the legality of the removal at issue upon the government's compliance with
the Tenure of Office Act, id. at 177, the same statute that he would retrospectively
invalidate in Myers.
In the same year, he also advised Assistant Secretary of the Treasury A.L. Spaulding
of his distaste for limiting removals to "cause." His letter said in part:
It is impossible to properly conduct a department and limit the power of
removal to cases where specific charges can be proven of inefficiency,
negligence, or want of fidelity. All I can say is that if I were Secretary of
the Treasury, in charge of the duty of administering that great department,
I should not wish to have as one of my subordinates a man who allows
himself to manifest so much sympathy, and render so much substantial
aid to persons whose interests are entirely opposed to that of the Govern-
ment.
A. MASoN, WsViAm HowARD TAR: CHmF JusTicE 254 (1965).
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he urged Congress to relieve the President of all but the most
significant personnel decisions. As long as the chief executive
had to concern himself with the trivialities of low-level appoint-
ments, he should have complete authority to remove anyone
whom he had installed in office. On the other hand, only a few
high-level positions really required direct presidential supervi-
sion; the remainder could be filled in other ways with no harm
to the public interest.
However perplexing the decision and all of its surrounding
circumstances, the Court appeared to have resolved the long
debate over the removal power, once and for all, in favor of
the President.' 72 Congress acknowledged this broad reading by
omitting any reference to removal in several important new
regulatory statutes passed shortly after the decision.173 Still un-
settled, however, was the validity of preexisting statutes that
purported to restrict the grounds for removal to specified causes.
The answer to this question was not long in coming.
B. The Humphrey's Executor Decision
Within nine years, the apparent finality of Myers would be
called into doubt. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 74
a unanimous Court "recanted much of the Taft opinion' '1 75 by
holding that a statutory provision authorizing the dismissal of
Federal Trade Commissioners "for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office" 76 precluded the President from ousting
'1 Ironically, more than 30 years after Myers invalidated the statutory requirement
of Senate consent for the removal of local postmasters, federal law still required the
upper chamber to approve the discharge of the Postmaster General and the Assistant
Postmasters General. E. CoRwIN, THE PRESmNT: OMCE AND PowEns 375 n.64 (4th
ed. 1957).
M E.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 1, 4, 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (Federal Communications
Commission); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion)).
74 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
'" E. CoRwin, supra note 172, at 91.
,7' Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (1914) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)).
This language was taken from the removal provision of the Interstate Commerce
Act. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. As with that statute, Congress devoted
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a commissioner for purely political reasons and that this provi-
sion did not unconstitutionally constrain the President's removal
power.
This holding was remarkable for at least three reasons. First,
the Taft opinion in Myers had gone out of its way to suggest
that such provisions did not limit the President's inherent au-
thority to remove.' 77 Second, that suggestion in Myers rested
upon the express holding of Shurtleff v. United States, 78 which
construed identical statutory language.17 9 Third, the four remain-
ing members of the Myers majority approved this conclusion
unhesitatingly; one of them, Justice Sutherland, actually wrote
the Humphrey's Executor opinion. Behind this mysterious judi-
cial about-face lie some understandable political and historical
explanations. Nevertheless, Humphrey's Executor, like Myers,
has more than its share of ironies and curiosities.
The factual background in Humphrey's Executor was more
straightforward than that in Myers. 80 William E. Humphrey, a
lawyer from Seattle, Washington, was elected to seven terms in
the House of Representatives beginning in 1902. His tenure was
marked by extreme conservatism, outspokenly partisan attacks
upon his opponents, and great solicitude for the merchant ma-
rine and shipping interests that were important to his constitu-
ents. After an unsuccessful run for the Senate in 1916, he played
an active role in Republican party affairs and aggressively sought
a government appointment as a reward for his loyalty. His
efforts bore fruit in 1925, when President Coolidge named him
to the Federal Trade Commission.
In that position, Humphrey took a central part in redirecting
agency policies and procedures away from strong enforcement
little or no independent attention to the meaning or significance of this provision when
it passed the FTC Act. See R. CusHmAN, supra note 16, at 198-99. The standard early
study of the agency does not mention the subject. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COmmiSsIoN 1-48 (1924) (reviewing background and legislative history of FTC
Act).
" 272 U.S. at 171-72.
17A 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
'' See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
' The basic facts are set out in the opinion of the Court. 295 U.S. at 618-19. For
more detailed accounts, see Leuchtenburg, supra note 165, at 276-80; N.Y. Times, Sept.
18, 1933, at 4, col. 3; id., Oct. 8, 1933, § 1, at 24, col. 2; id., Oct. 10, 1933, at 29,
col. 2; id., Dec. 29, 1933, at 2, col. 8; id., Feb. 15, 1934, at 19, col. 1.
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of the antitrust laws. In 1931, President Hoover renominated
Humphrey, who had come to personify the evils that had led
many critics to urge the abolition of the FTC, for another seven-
year term. The Senate confirmed him, but twenty-eight members
voted against the reappointment.
Although many of the Commission's difficulties in this pe-
riod resulted from restrictive judicial rulings,"8 ' the agency was
widely viewed as "a dumping ground for [undeserving benefi-
ciaries of] political patronage. 11 2 President Roosevelt decided
to replace Humphrey with a less obstreperous Republican who,
together with two other new appointees, might revitalize the
bipartisan, five-member Commission. That in turn would qualify
the FTC for important new responsibilities in Roosevelt's eco-
nomic recovery program.183 When Humphrey refused repeated
requests to resign, the President peremptorily removed him from
office.'8 4 No reason was given for the removal, although the
White House's last letter to Humphrey prior to the formal ouster
made clear that the action was based upon policy differences.' 5
Humphrey challenged his removal, retaining William Dono-
van, a distinguished Republican attorney who had held a variety
of important governmental positions and who would go on to
an almost legendary career in both the public and private sec-
tors.8 6 Although Humphrey had sought to turn his case into a
"I See C. McFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CobmnssION AND
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1920-1930, at 43-99 (1933); Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1231-33 (1986).
182 E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. ScmuLz, TE NADER REPORT ON THm FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 140 (1969).
"I' See id.; R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 107 (1941);
Leuchtenburg, supra note 165, at 280, 305-08.
'84 See Leuchtenburg, supra note 165, at 281-88.
185 That letter, dated August 31, 1933, said in part:
You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my
mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the
Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I think it is best for the people
of this country that I should have a full confidence.
295 U.S. at 619.
Humphrey was informed of his dismissal in a one-sentence notice. He was replaced
by George C. Matthews, a Republican and long-time member of the Wisconsin Public
Utilities Commission. Leuchtenburg, supra note 165, at 288.
116 Donovan had held a variety of positions in the Justice Department (including a
stint as Acting Attorney General) during the Coolidge administration and had run
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partisan issue, he did not seek reinstatement; instead he filed
suit in the Court of Claims for his unpaid salary. The govern-
ment was so confident of its legal position that Solicitor General
Reed, looking for an easy victory, chose the case for his first
Supreme Court appearance.
8 7
The Court, like the new solicitor general, found this an easy
case. 18 To the chagrin of the administration, however, the jus-
tices found it easy in favor of Humphrey. Justice Sutherland,
who not only had joined the Taft opinion in Myers but also had
been a vocal opponent of the legislation establishing the FTC
when he served in the Senate," 9 wrote the opinion. And it was
a most curious opinion indeed.
Perhaps as a result of the tenor of the Myers opinion, the
Humphrey's Executor Court did not focus upon the- quite dif-
ferent statutory removal provisions but rather upon the precise
location of the offices in question. The postmaster in Myers was
a purely executive officer, "charged with no duty at all related
to either the legislative or judicial power." 19 By contrast, a
Federal Trade Commissioner "cannot in any proper sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive ... [because]
the commission acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-
judicially."' 9' The legislative history plainly indicated that Con-
gress meant for the FTC "not to be 'subject to anybody in the
government but ... only to the people of the United States';
... to be 'separate and apart from any existing department of
the government-not subject to the orders of the President.' "192
unsuccessfully for governor of New York as the Republican candidate in 1932. This last
effort, of course, was the race to win President Roosevelt's previous office. See generally
T. TROY, DONOVAN D THE CIA 25-27 (1981).
' Leuchtenburg, supra note 165, at 289-91.
The case had reached the Supreme Court when the Court of Claims certified the
constitutional questions raised by Humphrey's dismissal for interlocutory review. 295
U.S. at 618.
1, It took the Court just under four weeks to issue its decision in Humphrey's
Executor. See 295 U.S. at 602.
" R. CusmNaN, supra note 16, at 203-04, 210-12; L. JAFma & N. NATHANSON,
CASES AND MNATERias ON ADMInSTRA=iE LAW 158 (4th ed. 1976).
295 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 628.
2 Id. at 625. The quotations are from the congressional debates, but the Court
does not cite either the speakers or the place where those statements appear.
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Instead, the Commission was "an agency of the legislative or
judicial departments" that might exercise "executive functions-
as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional
sense."1 93 The Court "disapproved" the broad language of Myers
as dictum having no binding effect.194 The opinion distinguished
the troublesome Shurtleff decision on the somewhat dubious
ground that the statute in question there said nothing about the
duration of the appointment, whereas the FTC Act provided for
fixed terms of seven years.
195
As in Myers, the Court's reasoning prompts numerous ques-
tions. At the most basic level, the definition of a "purely exec-
utive" officer is elusive at best. 96 Even the postmaster in Myers
had the duty to exclude obscene and fraudulent matter from the
malls; determining what items fell within those categories seems
closer to a judicial than to an executive function.197
As for the FTC itself, the Court failed to explain how an
agency can be free from political control by anyone in the
government. It is also unclear how the Commission could be in
both the legislative and judicial branches simultaneously in light
of the Court's emphasis upon the "fundamental necessity for
maintaining each of the three general departments of government
entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or
indirect, of either of the others."' 193 Finally, it is difficult to
understand why "an administrative body created by Congress to
carry into effect legislative policies embodied in [a] statute...
cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye
of the executive,"' 99 when that seems to be the very definition
'93 Id. at 628.
114 Id. at 626.
191 Id. at 622-23.
The Shurtleff Court seemed troubled that so minor a presidential appointee as a
general appraiser would, in effect, acquire life tenure if the statutory grounds for removal
were construed as exclusive. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315-17 (1903). See
supra note 123. Of course, the same official would acquire life tenure, subject to removal
for cause, if selected as a civil servant under the merit system rather than as a political
appointee.
"9 See Bruff, supra note 165, at 479-80.
197 See Nathanson, supra note 93, at 1101. See also infra notes 244-56 & 294-300
and accompanying text.
"9 295 U.S. at 629.
I Id. at 628.
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of an executive organ.20 The Court's unadorned distinction be-
tween an "executive function" and "executive power in the
constitutional sense''201 is singularly unilluminating in this re-
spect.
Whatever analytical difficulties the Humphrey's Executor
opinion may pose, the question remains why the Court retreated
so drastically from the seemingly clear and expansive views
enunciated in Myers. The most common explanation emphasizes
that the decision was handed down on the same day as A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,20 2 another unanimous
and far more significant ruling involving executive authority. In
Schechter, the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, part of the core of the President's reform program.
Various commentators have suggested that the Court had grown
concerned over undue concentrations of presidential power and
that the prospect of wholesale removals of recalcitrant officials
serving on nonpartisan "expert" tribunals led the justices to
blink at the broadest implications of the Myers opinion.20 3 It has
also been hypothesized that the emergence of European dicta-
torships during this period may have sensitized the Court to the
dangers of excessive executive power. 2 4
The administration predictably viewed the matter less dis-
passionately. The decision reportedly enraged President Roose-
velt, who regarded it as a political attack against him by an
unremittingly hostile judiciary. His reaction was so strong that
it may have precipitated his ill-fated Court-packing plan.205 In
See Bruff, supra note 165, at 480 n.141.
Strauss, supra note 74, at 611-12.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 157, at 115-16; Strauss, supra note 74, at
611; see also Burkoff, supra note 16, at 1406 n.332; Scalia, Historical Anomalies in
Administrative Law, 1985 Y.B. SUtP. CT. HIsT. Soc'Y 103, 107-08.
: See Strauss, supra note 74, at 612 n.154.
: Leuchtenburg, supra note 165, at 310-11.
The President was particularly upset that the opinion did not even recognize that
he might have relied in good faith upon the broad language in Myers. Administration
officials thought the decision had been written "with a design to give the impression
that the President had flouted the Constitution, rather than that the Court had changed
its mind within the past ten years." R. JACKSOn, supra note 183, at 109. Justice Jackson
later recalled that Roosevelt "thought [the justices] went out of their way to spite him
personally and they were giving him a different kind of deal than they were giving Taft
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addition, the ruling apparently prompted him to abandon his
ambitious plans to reform the FTC and may have led him to
seek alternative means for controlling administrative agencies.
206
Beyond analytical difficulties with the opinion and factors
that led to the Court's change of mind, there remains the prob-
lem of assessing the legal implications of Myers and Humphrey's
Executor. One might reconcile the holdings of these contrasting
decisions in two ways. The first focuses upon the statutory
provisions at issue. In Myers, the Senate was made a formal
part of the removal process by virtue of the requirement that it
consent to the dismissal of postmasters before the expiration of
their terms. In Humphrey's Executor, Congress limited the
grounds for firing a Federal Trade Commissioner, but the Pres-
ident retained the power to remove. Indeed, Solicitor General
Beck urged precisely such a "middle ground" in Myers, but the
Court could not, or would not, grasp it.
207
[sic]." E. GERHaRT, AmERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 99 (1958).
Another presidential aide recalled Roosevelt's regret that he had not pressed formal
charges against Humphrey. Harold Ickes reported that the President claimed to have
"actual proof of malfeasance in office" but thought "he could get rid of [Humphrey]
by milder methods." Leuchtenburg, supra note 165, at 310 (quoting 1 H. IcKrs, THE
SEcRET DIARY OF HAROLD IcTUs 374 (1954)).
2m See E. Cox, R. FEwsmTH & J. ScHUmz, supra note 182, at 140. On the effort
to bring the agencies under greater presidential control, see B. KARL, supra note 1, at
190-95.
272 U.S. at 96 (oral argument for the United States).
The point arose at two different places in the Solicitor General's oral argument.
He first broached the subject as follows:
It is not necessary in this case to determine the full question as to
this power of removal. This Court can say that this particular Act is
unconstitutional, without denying to the Congress the power to create
legislative standards of public service, which have a legitimate relation to
the nature and scope of the office, and the qualifications of the incumbent.
Id. at 90.
He returned to this question soon afterward, saying:
If you take my middle ground, that Congress may guide and direct
the discretion of the President by such statutory qualifications as are
properly inherent in the nature of an office, but without disturbing the
power of removal as the Constitution vested it, Congress can not destroy
the independence of the Executive.
Id. at 96. The government developed this line of argument in more detail in its brief.
See Substitute Brief for the United States on Reargument, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 174,
supra note 129, at 69-71.
Just moments later, Chief Justice Taft engaged the Solicitor General in the following
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This middle ground approach would hold that arrangements
such as the Tenure of Office Act are unconstitutional because
they give Congress a direct role in the removal process. Legis-
lative involvement poses a serious risk that Congress will seek
to aggrandize its power at the President's expense by arbitrarily
withholding consent to the discharge of officials who have lost
the chief executive's confidence. 20 8 This risk is especially acute
with respect to cabinet members, as the events surrounding the
impeachment of Andrew Johnson graphically illustrate.209 These
department heads are directly responsible to the President210 and,
as Chief Justice Taft correctly emphasized in Myers, they per-
form duties involving the exercise of discretion virtually as pres-
idential alter egos. 21' Concern over the implications of requiring
the President to retain an unsatisfactory person in so sensitive a
position undoubtedly influenced the members of the First Con-
colloquy:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Beck, would it interrupt you for me to
ask you to state specifically what your idea is in regard to the middle
ground to which you referred? What kind of a method did you mean?
MR. BECK. Well, I instanced one case, Mr. Chief Justice. I will try
to give two or three illustrations: Take, for example, the kind of law I
first cited, a law that says that an office is created and that the President
shall appoint somebody to the office, and that he shall be removable for
inefficiency and dishonesty. That largely leaves the President's prerogative
untouched.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Do you mean that he still would retain the
power of absolute removal without having any such cause as that mentioned
in the statute?
MR. BECK. Exactly. And he would apply the legislative standard
that had been given to him, viz, whether the incumbent was inefficient or
dishonest.
272 U.S. at 96 (oral argument for the United States).
The exchange suggests two completely different understandings of the "middle
ground." The Solicitor General plainly meant that a statute of the sort at issue in
Humphrey's Excecutor would be a permissible means of limiting the grounds upon which
the President might remove an appointed officer. Chief Justice Taft, on the other hand,
apparently viewed Shurtleff as controlling, thereby leaving the President with unfettered
discretion to remove on the statutory grounds or any other.
See Strauss, supra note 74, at 614.
: See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
: The President is authorized to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices." U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
21 272 U.S. at 132-35.
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gress as they debated the power to remove cabinet officers in
1789.212
The difficulty with this analysis is that, on purely logical
grounds, the argument becomes less compelling when applied to
lower-ranking officials such as local postmasters, who are far
removed from meaningful contact with the President. 213 Never-
theless, one might find that, as a matter of history, the conflict
over the Tenure of Office Act shows that the formal involvement
of Congress in the process of removing governmental officers
(other than by way of the rarely used device of impeachment)
poses unacceptable risks of internecine political warfare between
the legislative and executive branches. Those same risks exist
even with respect to many subordinate officers. In other words,
just as the proper construction of the appointments clause is a
matter of practicality rather than of pure logic, so also has a
practical consensus emerged on the question of removal.
A more elaborate, but perhaps equally problematical, focus
upon the structure of the Constitution also suggests that the
analysis retains much of its force even for subordinate officers.
After all, the department heads must have high-level assistants
to aid them in implementing presidential policy. At some point,
however, the argument becomes unconvincing; every assistant
presumably also needs an assistant, a proposition that leads
ineluctably to Chief Justice Taft's position in Myers. One might
arbitrarily distinguish offices as to which congressional partici-
pation in removals poses unacceptable risks from those as to
which it does not. Hard questions undoubtedly would arise over
how and where to draw the line. The resulting categories prob-
ably would correspond roughly to the positions of superior
officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and inferior officers, who may be
appointed by the department heads.
The precise classification of any particular office does not
pose significant problems for this structural argument, however.
The danger of congressional aggrandizement at the expense of
the executive precludes direct legislative participation (other than
212 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
2 See Van Alstyne, supra note 157, at 114-15.
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by way of impeachment) in the dismissal of superior officers
who are directly responsible to the President. As for lower-
ranking personnel, a Congress that is unwilling to afford the
chief executive unlimited removal authority could create more
inferior offices. The appointments clause allows such positions
to be filled by the heads of departments, with the President
completely excluded from the selection process. Because the
power to remove is incident to the power to appoint, the chief
executive could not dismiss the holders of these inferior of-
fices.214 The availability of this alternative means of checking
presidential power suggests that direct congressional participa-
tion in removal, as provided in the Tenure of Office Act and
the postmaster statute, is not necessary and proper to the attain-
ment of any lawful legislative goal.215
At the same time, this approach would allow Congress to
set standards for removals that would bind the President. Thus,
the legislative branch might permit the chief executive to dis-
charge at least certain appointed officials only for cause.21 6 Con-
gress could specify the grounds for removal pursuant to its power
214 See supra text accompanying notes 103 & 115-16.
"I At first glance, this structural argument seems inconsistent with Chief Justice
Marshall's authoritative construction of the necessary and proper clause: "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). Marshall's interpretation appears to
leave the choice of means to Congress, subject only to deferential judicial review.
Marshall refused to "impute to the framers . . . , when granting these powers for the
public good, the intention of impeding their exercise, by withholding a choice of means."
Id. at 408. He construed the word "necessary" to permit the use of "any means
calculated to produce the end," thus rejecting a definition limited to "those single
means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable." Id. at 413-14.
The McCulloch case, however, did not involve any textual provision of the Con-
stitution that limits Congress' choice of means toward fulfilling a legitimate end. Marshall
expressly cautioned that, even under an expansive reading of the necessary and proper
clause, the government could not exceed the limits of its powers. Id. at 421. In these
terms, the end-constraining arbitrary presidential power-assuredly is legitimate; the
means, however, are not appropriate. See Nathanson, supra note 93, at 1105.
2'" Whether Congress may apply a for-cause requirement to the dismissal of cabinet
officers has led to disagreement among distinguished commentators. Compare Nathan-
son, supra note 93, at 1107-09 (suggesting an affirmative answer), and Strauss, supra
note 74, at 614 (same), with Van Alstyne, supra note 157, at 114 (suggesting a negative
answer).
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
under the necessary and proper clause to create positions and to
fix the terms, conditions, and qualifications for all governmental
offices. 217 The House and Senate would have no role in the
removal process other than having determined in advance the
permissible grounds for dismissal. Therefore, the risk of inter-
branch political struggles over individual personnel matters would
be much attenuated if not eliminated altogether.
Another reconciliation of Myers and Humphrey's Executor
focuses primarily upon the functions of the offices in question.
Although Justice Sutherland suggested infelicitously that the
Myers rule applied only to "purely executive" officers, defining
such positions is exceedingly difficult. Placing that issue to one
side for the moment, the duties of postmasters and FTC com-
missioners were sufficiently different that the President might be
entitled to varied levels of control over the two types of officials.
Despite the responsibilities of local postmasters under the fraud
and obscenity laws,218 these duties constitute a relatively minor
portion of their work. Moreover, their discretion to make rules
for the efficient operation of their own post offices seems un-
likely to impinge noticeably upon congressional authority. Thus,
allowing the President greater latitude in supervising and dis-
charging local postmasters does not appear to raise important
policy concerns.
On the other hand, the FTC had three principal functions,
according to the Humphrey's Executor Court. First, it could
issue cease and desist orders against unfair methods of compe-
tition following a formal adjudicatory proceeding. Second, it
could undertake investigations and recommend appropriate leg-
islation to Congress. Third, at the direction of a federal district
court, it could act as a master in chancery in antitrust suits
217 This analysis is consistent with that of Chief Justice Taft, although he rejected
the conclusion reached in the text. In Myers, he noted the existence of matters "so
peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular [executive] officer
as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer's inter-
pretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance." 272 U.S. at 135. If policy
considerations require the insulation of some executive personnel from direct presidential
supervision of particular decisions, presumably policy considerations may require that
executive personnel be protected against wholly arbitrary dismissal. See Strauss, supra
note 74, at 614.
218 See supra text accompanying note 197.
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brought by the Attorney General. 219 The first and third of these
functions involved the judicial process, in which considerations
of due process and basic fairness to litigants suggest the impro-
priety of direct presidential supervision. The second rendered the
Commission something of a congressional agent.220 Because the
agency's main functions were not executive in nature, the Pres-
ident's claim to supervision over its members was correspond-
ingly weaker. Thus, Congress might appropriately limit the
grounds upon which the President may remove such commis-
sioners.
In its only other pre-Bowsher foray into this thicket, the
Court opted for the functional approach. That case was notable,
not only for making that choice, but also for extending the
analysis even to positions concerning which Congress had said
nothing whatever about the subject of removal. Nevertheless,
this approach also raised difficult questions.
C. The Wiener Decision
Nearly a generation passed before the Court revisited the
removal question. The next case, Wiener v. United States,2
arose just as Humphrey's Executor had, from the effort of an
incoming President to replace officials originally chosen by a
predecessor belonging to the opposing political party. There were
two differences this time. First, the incoming chief executive was
a Republican rather than a Democrat. Second, this dismissal
involved a small agency that seems to have been more obscure
than controversial. In short, this case apparently arose as an
almost pure patronage matter, whereas Humphrey's Executor
could be characterized at least in part as a basic difference of
principle.
The agency in question was the War Claims Commission,
which had been created in 1948 to adjudicate the entitlement to
compensation of persons and religious organizations injured by
the enemy in World War II. The Commission had three mem-
bers, each of whom was appointed by President Truman, and
295 U.S. at 620-21.
z-' See Bruff, supra note 165, at 481-82; Strauss, supra note 74, at 612-14.
357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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was to go out of existence on March 31, 1955, three years after
the deadline for filing claims. The statute establishing the Com-
mission said nothing about removal.22
During his first year in office, President Eisenhower sought
the resignations of two of the three Commissioners. One was
Myron Wiener, a California lawyer who had spent a number of
years in China and was himself interned by the Japanese from
1941 until 1943.223 The other was Georgia Lusk, a former Dem-
ocratic Representative from New Mexico. 4 When they refused
to resign, the President formally removed them. Eisenhower said
only that he "regard[ed] it as in the national interest" to operate
the Commission "with personnel of my own selectibn.' '2 Just
over six months later, on July 1, 1954, he abolished the agency
altogether under a reorganization plan.?2 6 The ousted Commis-
sioners then filed suit for their salaries .27
222 The statement of facts, unless otherwise indicated, is taken from the opinion of
the Court. Id. at 350-51.
22 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1950, at 4, col. 1.
22 N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1953, at 19, col. 2.
"1 357 U.S. at 350.
Wiener believed that he had been removed for purely political reasons. In reply to
President Eisenhower's notice of dismissal, Wiener wrote:
While the exigencies of party politics and political commitments make
certain demands, I do not believe such circumstances should afford The
[sic] President a basis for ignoring the Congressional mandate to each
member of the Commission to assist the Congress in performing its tra-
ditional legislative functions of investigation and the judicial determination
of the rights of innocent victims of World War II to relief under an Act
of Congress.
Letter from Myron Wiener to the President, Dec. 14, 1953 (copy on file with author).
21 The reorganization plan was issued pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1949,
ch. 226, 63 Stat. 203.
2m The decision discussed in the text actually concerned only Wiener's suit for back
salary for the period from December 10, 1953, the effective date of the removal, to
June 30, 1954, the last day of the Commission's existence. The Court of Claims, with
one judge dissenting, dismissed this suit. Wiener v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 827, 142
F. Supp. 910 (1956), rev'd, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
There is a little-known historical footnote to this phase of the affair. Chief Justice
Burger, who was an assistant attorney general at the time, signed the government's
answer and brief in the Court of Claims. Burger's name does not appear in the reported
decision because he became a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit before the Court of Claims issued its ruling. Accordingly,
his successor was substituted as counsel of record. See 135 Ct. Cl. at 827, 142 F. Supp.
at 911. The parties and amici in Bowsher apparently were unaware of the Chief Justice's
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A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
ruled that the adjudicatory functions performed by the Com-
mission precluded the President from arbitrarily discharging its
members despite the statute's total silence on the subject. Hum-
phrey's Executor, the Court reasoned, gave the President unfet-
tered power to remove only purely executive officers; as for
those exercising independent judgment, "a power of removal
exists only if Congress may fairly be said to have conferred
it.'"'28
The best way to tell whether Congress implicitly had author-
ized the President at his discretion to discharge someone other
than a purely executive officer was to examine the function that
the officer exercised. Although Congress could have vested the
authority of the War Claims Commission in a purely executive
official,229 it had not. Instead, it gave the task to a body charged
to "adjudicate according to law."' 230 Moreover, the determina-
tions of the Commission were not subject to judicial review and
thus were final.2' Because the chief executive plainly could not
attempt to influence the outcome of any particular claim before
the agency, it was only logical to infer that "Congress did not
wish to have hang over the Commission the Damocles' sword
involvement in Wiener, and he did not refer to that experience in his Bowsher opinion.
See also infra note 300 (discussing Farley v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl. 672, 139 F. Supp.
757, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956), another removal case in which the Chief Justice
participated during his tenure as assistant attorney general).
After the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Claims ruling in Wiener, see
infra text accompanying notes 228-32, Commissioner Lusk also filed a claim for her pay
through June 30, 1954. That claim was paid without litigation. See Lusk v. United
States, 173 Ct. CL. 291, 294-95 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).
In a later action, both ousted members challenged the constitutionality of the order
abolishing the War Claims Commission and demanded their salaries from the effective
date of the reorganization plan that terminated the agency through the date upon which
it otherwise would have gone out of existence. This suit was dismissed on grounds of
laches. 173 Ct. Cl. at 298-302.
2 357 U.S. at 353.
Before reaching this conclusion, the Court belatedly recognized that President
Roosevelt had relied upon the expansive statements in Myers when he dismissed Hum-
phrey from the FTC. Id. at 351.
1=, The original legislative proposal for dealing with these claims would have vested
responsibility in the Federal Security Administrator, who was "indubitably an arm of





of removal by the President for no reason other than that he
preferred to have on that Commission men of his own choos-
ing. "232 Since the agency performed adjudicatory functions, the
President could remove its members only for cause.
Over the years, there have been numerous attempts to har-
monize this line of cases. 2 3 That is not surprising, because
Justice Sutherland recognized explicitly that a "field of doubt"
would be left by the apparently inconsistent rulings in the re-
moval cases.23 4 The two principal methods of reconciling these
decisions focus either upon the procedure for removal or upon
the functions performed by the officer in question. Each is
examined in greater detail in Part IV. Yet one practical lesson
emerges from the discussion thus far: whatever the formal legal
outcome, Presidents always have managed to rid themselves of
officials whom they have found objectionable for one reason or
another. Wilson ousted Myers and won a posthumous victory
when the statute the postmaster invoked was held unconstitu-
tional. Even if the statute had been upheld, however, Myers still
would have been removed; he could have recovered only his
back salary. Similarly, Roosevelt succeeded in replacing Hum-
phrey with a less recalcitrant Federal Trade Commissioner even
though the government had to pay his salary during the period
following his ouster. Indeed, Frank Myers and William Hum-
232 Id. at 356.
The reference to the Sword of Damocles most likely was drawn from Professor
Corwin's critique of the Myers decision, which uses the term precisely as it appeared in
Justice Frankfurter's opinion. In the preface to his study, Corwin argued that the
President should not be able to fire a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission
at will. How, he asked, could one expect the necessary independent judgment from "an
officer over whose head the Damocles sword of removal is ever suspended?" E. CoRwNiN,
supra note 63, at viii.
Justice Frankfurter almost certainly had read the Convin monograph, which dealt
in great detail with separation-of-powers problems. Before his appointment, Frankfurter
had been a leading scholar and teacher of administrative law. In the early 1930's, he
devoted the bulk of his course to separation-of-powers issues. Nathanson, supra note
93, at 1064.
23 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 57, at 186-91; Bruff, supra note 165, at 475-83;
Burkoff, supra note 16, at 1393-415; Donovan & Irvine, supra note 165, at 220-29;
Nathanson, supra note 93, at 1099-109; Parker, The Removal Power of the President
and Independent Administrative Agencies, 36 ID. L.J. 63 (1960); Strauss, supra note
74, at 609-16.
24 Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 632.
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phrey died before the ultimate Supreme Court rulings in their
lawsuits, leaving legal representatives to press their arguments.
This fact has prompted some cynical observers to find the real
lesson of these cases in their titles.235 Finally, Eisenhower suc-
ceeded not only in ridding himself of two War Claims Commis-
sioners but also managed to eliminate the agency itself. To date,
the Court has never ordered the President to reinstate an official
whom he has sacked .2 6 For most political sophisticates, that is
the real moral of these cases.
IV. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND Tim REMOVAL OF THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL
Bowsher concerned the procedure for removing a federal
officer who was to play a central role in the resolution of one
of the most important political and economic questions confront-
ing the nation. Unlike any of the previous controversies, the
procedure in question gave Congress rather than the President
the initiative to dismiss the officer. Indeed, Congress could
accomplish the removal over the objection of the President and
on grounds that would not suffice to impeach the official. At
the same time, however, neither an actual nor an attempted
discharge had occurred. Instead, the question involved whether
the Comptroller General could exercise the powers vested in him
by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in light of the method by
which the statute creating his office permitted him to be removed
in the future.
A. The Statutory Removal Procedure
The relevant portion of the statute governing the removal of
the Comptroller General provides:
" J. NHANSAW & R. MERRILL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AD.MINTSTRATIVE LAW 116
(2d ed. 1985) (quoting an unidentified colleague); Note, Incorporation of Independent
Agencies into the Evecutive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766, 1784 n.117 (1985). The full
captions of the cases in the Supreme Court were Lois Myers, Administratrix v. United
States and, of course, Humphrey's Executor v. United States.
"I As Clinton Rossiter put it, these cases demonstrate that "the President can
remove just about any official if he wants to badly enough, and the [Supreme] Court
will not be able to give the removed man anything more than sympathy and some back
salary." C. RossrrER, TH AMEpicAN PREsmENcY 58 (2d ed. 1960). But see L. TME,
supra note 57, at 189 (suggesting that courts may order reinstatement).
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[The] Comptroller General ... may be removed at any
time by-
(B) joint resolution of Congress, after notice and an op-
portunity for a hearing, only for-
(i) permanent disability;
(ii) inefficiency;
(iii) neglect of duty;
(iv) malfeasance; or
(v) a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.237
These procedures resemble certain aspects of those at issue
in both Myers and Humphrey's Executor, and differ from each
in other respects. Like the postmaster statute in Myers and unlike
the FTC Act in Humphrey's Executor, Congress has a formal
role in removing the Comptroller General. But like the FTC Act
and unlike the postmaster statute, the grounds for removal are,
at least in theory, limited.
This provision was controversial from the very beginning
because it gave the President a subordinate role in the removal
process. The position of Comptroller General was established by
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.218 The adoption of that
law culminated more than a decade of efforts to implement a
unified federal budget and to reform the government's financial
oversight procedures.239 Those efforts would have succeeded
sooner but for President Wilson's veto of an earlier version of
the Budget Act; Wilson specifically objected only to the proce-
dure for removing the Comptroller General. That version pro-
vided that Congress could remove the Comptroller General, on
the same grounds as those quoted above, by a concurrent reso-
-' 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1) (1982). The omitted clause, subsection (A), specified that
the Comptroller General also may be removed through the impeachment process.
23 Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 701-779 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)).
21 The Act created two new agencies to implement the new procedures. The General
Accounting Office, headed by the Comptroller General, took over the various financial
and accounting responsibilities which until then had been handled by the Comptroller
of the Treasury and other executive officials. The Bureau of the Budget was established
to help the President prepare a unified national budget. Previously, the various depart-
ments and agencies prepared their own budget requests and submitted them to Congress
with no overall coordination by anyone in the executive branch. See generally F. MosnR,
TiE GAO 17-63 (1979).
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lution. Because a concurrent resolution need not be presented to
the President for approval or veto, the chief executive would
have absolutely no power to dismiss an official whom he had
appointed. 240 Congress responded by requiring the use of a joint
resolution, which must be presented to the President, 241 and thus
assured the chief executive of at least a limited role in the
removal process. In that form, the Budget Act was signed by
President Harding. 242 The constitutional question continued to
lurk in the background, however. 243
B. The Court's Analysis
The Court in Bowsher reasoned that Gramm-Rudman-Holl-
ings authorized the Comptroller to perform duties of an execu-
tive nature but that the statute creating the Comptroller's position
effectively prevented the President from removing him. In this
regard, the opinion's structure is somewhat odd, focusing first
upon the removal procedure and then upon the nature of the
authority that the Comptroller exercised under the Act. The
following discussion proceeds first by examining the functions
'" 59 CONG. REc. 8609-10 (1920). See 7 DESCHEIR'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 34345 (1977).
"I United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 28 (1947); 7 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 333-34 (1977).
21 The change in the removal provision, the only substantial alteration in the bill
that Wilson had vetoed, was made as a gesture to the new President. Harding was much
less protective of executive prerogative than his predecessor had been; the switch from
concurrent to joint resolution probably would not have satisfied Wilson. H. MANSFIELD,
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 69-70 (1939); F. MOSHER, A TALE OF Two AGENCIES 31-32
(1984).
141 Uncertainty over the validity of the procedure for removing the Comptroller
General resurfaced within a few years after President Harding's approval of the Budget
and Accounting Act. The Myers decision prompted the National Municipal League to
commission Professor Corwin's analysis of the broader implications of Chief Justice
Taft's opinion out of concern that the opinion called into question the survival of one
of the most important reforms embodied in the 1921 law. See E. CORWIN, supra note
63, at iii-iv. The fear that judicial invalidation of the removal provision might destroy
the GAO and the position of Comptroller General was not entirely unfounded because
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 contained no severability clause. H. MANSFIELD,
supra note 242, at 81. The possible unconstitutionality of the removal procedure also
drew sporadic scholarly attention in subsequent years. See, e.g., L. JAFFE & N. NA-
THANSON, supra note 189, at 162; Note, The Comptroller General of the United States:
The Broad Power To Settle and Adjust All Claims and Accounts, 70 HARv. L. REv.
350, 351 n.12 (1956).
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that the statute delegated and then by evaluating the removal
procedure.
1. Characterizing the Comptroller General's Authority
Synthesizing the holdings of Myers and Humphrey's Execu-
tor, Chief Justice Burger concluded that "Congress cannot re-
serve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with
the execution of the laws except by impeachment." 244 The duties
that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings assigned the Comptroller General
"plainly entail[ed] execution of the law in constitutional terms."2 45
Those duties, which included the preparation of a report pro-
jecting federal revenues and expenditures and the promulgation
of legally binding spending reductions on a program-by-program
basis, required this official to interpret and to implement legis-
lation enacted by Congress. The interpretation and implemen-
tation of statutes represented "the very essence of 'execution'
of the law."26
This analysis is consistent with the temporal definition of
the respective roles of the political branches in the most impor-
tant recent separation-of-powers decision, INS v. Chadha.247 In-
validating the legislative veto In Chadha, the Chief Justice
explained that implementing a duly enacted statute is the prov-
ince of the executive branch; Congress may countermand such
action or alter the underlying policy only by passing new legis-
lation.28
Chadha's reasoning implies that reducing expenditures for
specific federal programs in order to reduce the deficit is an
intrinsically executive function. The Bowsher opinion, however,
clearly was not intended to reach so far. The Act contained a
fallback provision under which Congress would vote for the
necessary spending reductions if a court invalidated the auto-
matic budget-cutting mechanism.2A9 Since Congress would per-
form the Comptroller's tasks in those circumstances, and since
24 106 S. Ct. at 3188.
24 Id. at 3192.
24 Id.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
1" Id. at 954-55, 958.
249 See supra text accompanying note 45.
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any branch "presumptively exercis[es] the power the Constitu-
tion has delegated to it" when it takes any action,250 congres-
sional implementation of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings under the
fallback provision presumably is a legislative action. If imple-
menting the Act is a purely executive function, the fallback
procedure would be unconstitutional under this analysis. The
Bowsher Court, however, found the presence of the fallback
provision dispositive when it invalidated the Comptroller Gen-
eral's duties under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings instead of the re-
moval procedure contained in the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921.251
The existence of the fallback mechanism suggests that the
powers in question could be viewed as legislative rather than
executive. Under the Court's analysis, congressional action to
impose widespread, program-by-program spending reductions
would be presumptively legislative in nature. Ignoring the iden-
tity of the actor, one could regard the same action undertaken
by the Comptroller General, or by anyone else Congress might
designate, in precisely the same fashion. The person or agency
assigned this function would be a delegate of the legislature.
Although the proposition that Congress may not delegate the
legislative power has ancient roots,252 the Court has upheld vir-
tually every such delegation on record, even while reciting pla-
15, 462 U.S. at 951.
This presumption is based upon the erroneous assertion that the Constitution defines
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. See Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative
Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 132-
33.
" 106 S. Ct. at 3192-93.
The reprieve that the removal provision gained in Bowsher may prove only tem-
porary. Another pending case squarely presents the question whether, in light of the
removal provision, the Comptroller General may perform the arguably executive duties
assigned to him under the Competition in Contracting Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
2741(a) 98 Stat. 494, 1199-203 (1984) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556
(Supp. III 1985)). That statute contains no analogous fallback provision. Thus, this case
could require the court either to invalidate the removal provision or to render the
Competition in Contracting Act completely ineffective. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), reh'g
en banc denied, Nos. 85-5226 & 85-5377 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 1987).
2 2 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
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titudinal condemnations of the practice .2 3 If this alternative view
is correct, then Gramm-Rudman-Hollings should be evaluated
under the nondelegation doctrine. That doctrine focuses upon
the delegability of the function, the standards embodied in the
delegation, and the competence of the delegate.254 The procedure
for removing the delegate becomes, if not entirely irrelevant,
then at least distinctly secondary in significance. 25
In the end, no logically compelling basis exists to prefer
either characterization of the Comptroller General's duties under
the Act. The Court labeled the duties as executive, although it
as easily could have described them as legislative. This does not
mean that the majority made an incorrect choice, only that it
made an arbitrary one.2 6 The question remains, however, whether
the removal procedures infringe so severely upon presidential
authority as to disqualify the Comptroller from exercising what
the Court deemed executive responsibilities.
2. The Validity of the Removal Provision
The majority opinion read the removal provision as author-
izing Congress alone to dismiss the Comptroller General. Since
the action must be taken by means of a joint resolution, the
initiative for discharge belongs to the legislature. Moreover,
while the President may veto a joint resolution, both houses of
Congress could override the veto by a two-thirds majority, thereby
effecting the Comptroller General's removal even over the chief
executive's objection.2 57
The Court drew what it saw as an obvious conclusion from
this arrangement: because only Congress could fire the Comp-
3 The only exceptions to this pattern occurred more than 50 years ago. A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
21 See infra Part V.
211 Justice Stevens took a somewhat similar position in his separate opinion. See
106 S. Ct. at 3194-96 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). The existence of the
two alternative methods of implementing the statute prompted him to characterize the
duties in question as "chameleon-like" and to label them as "legislative." Id. at 3201
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
For a critical discussion of other aspects of Justice Stevens' position, see infra notes
339-47 and accompanying text.
- See Elliott, supra note 250, at 135.
2 106 S. Ct. at 3189 & n.7.
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troller General, only Congress could control him.25 Quoting the
district court, the Chief Justice said that placing the exclusive
removal authority in the legislative branch meant that it was
only that branch which the Comptroller " 'must fear and, in
the performance of his functions, obey.' "259 In short, the re-
moval procedure rendered the Comptroller General "subservient
to Congress" in fulfilling his duties under Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings.210 Such subservience of an official performing executive
functions was constitutionally impermissible.261
Although this last point is indisputable, it is far from clear
that such subservience actually existed in this case. First, the
President's role in removing the Comptroller General is likely to
be considerably larger than the majority suggests. Even if he
lacks the formal authority to initiate a removal, every chief
executive has a large corps of loyal supporters in both houses
of Congress. Any President who wants to fire a Comptroller
will have no trouble finding cooperative legislators to introduce
the required joint resolution.
Second, the difficulty of mustering the required two-thirds
majority to override a presidential veto of a removal resolution
makes the prospect of a runaway Congress very remote. Since
the Constitution mandates only a simple majority in the House,
impeaching the Comptroller General-or the President himself-
requires fewer votes than does overriding a veto. Similarly,
simply passing an alternative package of spending cuts also takes
fewer votes-simple majorities in both chambers-than does
dismissing the Comptroller over executive opposition.
Third, the language of the removal provision limits the
grounds for dismissing the Comptroller General. While those
grounds are not as narrow as the grounds for impeachment,
they are not so broad as to encompass entirely arbitrary or
whimsical reasons. Indeed, the statutory assurance of a preter-
mination hearing suggests that ousting the Comptroller General
would present a formidable challenge.
Id. at 3189.
' Id. at 3188 (quoting 626 F. Supp. at 1401).
Id.
The district court went further, finding that the removal procedure "create[ld] ...
here-and-now subservience to another branch." 626 F. Supp. at 1392.
:1 106 S. Ct. at 3188-89.
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Finally, the nature of the Comptroller General's office mil-
itates against a precipitous removal over the President's oppo-
sition. Because the Comptroller performs many functions for
Congress under a variety of statutes that are entirely unrelated
to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,2 62 the legislative branch has little
incentive to discharge him for other than the most serious rea-
son. Indeed, since the creation of the office in 1921, no Comp-
troller has been removed or even threatened with removal.
263
Further, the Comptroller lacks incentive to trim his sails in hopes
of retaining his position; by statute, he may serve a single,
fifteen-year term with no possibility of reappointment.
264
Moreover, as a practical matter, the threat of removal is a
much less effective means for controlling the Comptroller Gen-
eral than numerous other, more subtle devices available to Con-
gress. For example, the legislative branch could abolish the office
altogether, though that prospect seems unlikely for the reasons
stated in the preceding paragraph. More realistically, Congress
may lower the Comptroller's salary, reduce his staff, or move
his office to South Succotash.265 Any or all of these steps might
induce the Comptroller to resign, even if the President earnestly
desired that he remain on the job. Thus, if the Comptroller
General is subservient to Congress, his subservience is unrelated
to the statutory removal procedure.
See id. at 3196-98 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing statutory
duties of Comptroller General).
It is particularly striking that no action was taken against the Comptroller
General in the years between Myers and Humphrey's Executor, when the President
seemed to have unchallengeable authority to fire anyone he had appointed. During this
period, the Comptroller had bitter disputes with several cabinet members yet emerged
with his position entirely secure against executive wrath. H. MANSFmD, supra note 242,
at 76.
- 31 U.S.C. § 703(b) (1982).
Professor Mosher notes that the Comptroller General's 15-year term is the longest
fixed tenure enjoyed by any federal officer. F. MOSHER, supra note 239, at 242.
20 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note
337.
The possibility that Congress might move an office to oust its director is not
entirely hypothetical. An analogous situation arose in 1983, when the executive branch
relocated an office in order to retain an agency director. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health was transferred to Atlanta because its recently appointed
director had refused to move to Washington. There was general agreement that Congress
had the legal authority to block the transfer, although legislative efforts to do so proved
unsuccessful. Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1983, at A13.
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In fact, the legislative history strongly suggests that the re-
moval procedure was entirely irrelevant to the decision to give
the Comptroller General important responsibilities under Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings. The subject of removal was not mentioned at
all during the debates. 266 Instead, members of Congress included
the Comptroller because they did not trust the Office of Man-
agement and Budget to implement the law in good faith and
could not find any other agency to which to entrust that task.
267
Admittedly, these considerations, either alone or in combi-
nation, may not have sufficient legal significance to refute the
:, 106 S. Ct. at 3218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Despite this legislative oversight, President Reagan specifically questioned the le-
gality of vesting the Comptroller General with authority under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
because of the removal provision in the 1921 Budget Act. Statement on Signing H.J.
Res. 372 Into Law, 21 WEEKLY Corn,. PREs. Doc. 1490, 1491 (Dec. 12, 1985).
",7 Members of both parties, including one of the principal sponsors of the Act,
recognized that the OMB, as a presidential agent, was likely to distort its projections of
the budget deficit in accordance with the chief executive's wishes. See, e.g., 131 CONG.
REc. S12701 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Rudman) ("We know OMB tends
to work for the President and [the Congressional Budget Office], it seems to me, ...
has been more accurate."); id. (remarks of Sen. Hart) ("OMB has been cooking its
books for 5 years. We have all known that .... You have a political estimating operation
up the street which cooks its books regularly, and you have the CBO trying to be
honest."); id. at S13113 (daly ed. Oct. 10, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("the admin-
istration can ... manipulate when the automatic cuts will go into effect if the Office
of Management and Budget cooks the numbers"); id. at S12897 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1985)
(remarks of Sen. Chiles) ("We ... know that OMB has never been nonpartisan, whether
there was a Democrat as President or a Republican. It has always been an arm and an
instrument of the administration."); id. at S12754 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1985) (remarks of
Sen. Glenn) (characterizing OMB as "a truly partisan arm of the President" and decrying
the "enormous potential for abuse here, in the introduction of partisan budget projec-
tions to [s]kew the workings of the bill towards the President's advantage"). The
emphasis upon the power of the OMB, which has played a central role in government
policymaking in recent years, contrasts sharply with the generally peripheral role that its
predecessor, the Bureau of the Budget, played during most of its existence. See Schick,
The Budget Bureau That Was: Thoughts on the Rise, Decline, and Future of a Presi-
dential Agency, in THE INSrrrtnrONA=zaD PREStENCY 93, 95-105 (N. Thomas & H.
Baade eds. 1972).
Although the statements quoted above demonstrate that many members would have
preferred to vest the implementation of the law in the Congressional Budget Office,
such a course would have been clearly unconstitutional under existing precedents. The
Director of the CBO is appointed by Congress. 2 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (1982). An official
so selected may not exercise significant authority pursuant to a public law. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). Since implementation of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings unquestionably would have involved the exercise of such authority, the Director
of the CBO was legally disqualified from performing those duties. See 106 S. Ct. at
3216 n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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constitutional conclusion that the majority reached. The presence
of presidential loyalists in Congress still requires the chief exec-
utive to seek legislative assistance in beginning the process of
discharging an official exercising executive power. The difficulty
of mustering a two-thirds vote in each house to oust the Comp-
troller General will not necessarily prevent legislators who cannot
agree upon a specific set of budget cuts from taking revenge
against the architect of the one specific proposal on the table.
Neither the statutory limitation upon grounds for removal nor
the provision for a pretermination hearing can assure a legally
correct outcome. Congress could act irrationally, or a Comp-
troller General might alter his judgments to avoid even a minimal
likelihood of such an eventuality. Finally, benign congressional
intent cannot authorize legislation that violates the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the Comptroller General cannot properly be
characterized as subservient to anyone. Respected political sci-
entists agree that this official is as insulated from external pres-
sures as any in the government. 261 In real terms, the Comptroller
is "practically irremovable.' '269 Moreover, because the whole
purpose of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings mechanism was to re-
lieve Congress of the unpalatable task of voting for specific
expenditure reductions, the notion that the legislative branch
might oust the Comptroller General out of pique over his im-
plementation of his duties under the Act verges on the fanciful.
This impressive array of checks minimizing the likelihood of
arbitrary, hasty, or ill-considered congressional action against
the Comptroller carried no weight with the Chief Justice. "The
separated powers of our government," he explained, "can not
be permitted to turn on judicial assessment of whether an officer
These scholars phrase their conclusions in unusually colorful terms. In the words
of Professor Mansfield, "[T]he Comptroller General, once confirmed, is safe so long as
he avoids a public exhibition of personal immorality, dishonesty, or failing mentality."
H. MA~sFrEa, supra note 242, at 75-76.
Professor Mosher concludes that, "[b]arring resignation, death, physical or mental
incapacity, or extremely bad behavior, the Comptroller General is assured his tenure if
he wants it, and not a day more." F. MosHER, supra note 239, at 242 (footnote omitted).
16 F. MosIR, supra note 239, at 4.
As Justice Blackmun put it, "If Congress in 1921 wished to make the Comptroller
General its lackey, it did a remarkably poor job." 106 S. Ct. at 3219 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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exercising executive power is on good terms with Congress." 270
The removal provision left open the possibility that the legislative
branch could fire an official performing important executive
functions; its very existence posed an unacceptable risk that the
official would modify his behavior, perhaps only subconsciously,
to avoid dismissal.
One can best understand the Chief Justice's reasoning by
examining his treatment of Justice White's argument in dissent
that the statute prohibits removal at will and that any purported
removal by Congress would be subject to judicial review.2 71 The
majority noted simply that no one could be sure about the
availability of judicial review.2 72 More significantly, the Chief
Justice characterized as an "arguable premis[e]" the notion that
the grounds for removal specified in the statute are exclusive. 273
In support of this point, he cited Shurtleff, the 1903 decision in
which the Court held that the grounds for removal specified in
the law creating the position of general appraiser of merchandise
could not, in the absence of clear and explicit language, be
viewed as barring removal for other reasons, or for none. 274
The citation to Shurtleff reflected the Chief Justice's adher-
ence to a very strong separation-of-powers doctrine. If the lan-
guage in the Budget and Accounting Act is not sufficiently clear
and explicit to constrain Congress from firing the Comptroller
General only for the reasons expressed, then the legislative branch
presumably could fire him for any reason at all. In that event,
however, the logic of Shurtleff would also mean that the statu-
tory language is ineffective to preclude the President from dis-
missing the Comptroller General for any reason at all on the
familiar theory that the power to remove is incident to the
r. 106 S. Ct. at 3191.
2 Id. at 3211 (White, J., dissenting).
Il Id. at 3190 & n.8.
273 Id. at 3190.
He went on to question whether the statutory limitation to grounds such as
"inefficiency" and "malfeasance" in fact operate meaningfully to constrain congres-
sional discretion to fire the Comptroller. These terms may be uncomfortably close to
"maladministration," a basis for impeachment that the framers expressly rejected. Id.
1" See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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President's power to appoint that official.275 This possibility
would not satisfy the Chief Justice even though it would give
the President a formal-and unimpeded-role in the removal
process. The vice of the statute, from this perspective, is not
simply that the chief executive might be left out of the process,
but rather that Congress has a direct role in the dismissal of an
officer exercising executive power. Legislative participation in
such a removal, other than through impeachment, is exactly
what Myers prohibits.
276
So viewed, Bowsher is an easy case. 277 The result follows
directly from the leading case and is fully consistent with the
language of more recent precedents concerning the removal
power. Yet the majority opinion strikingly fails to address almost
all of the arguments that, due to the checks and balances built
into the Budget and Accounting Act and the realities of politics
in contemporary Washington, the Comptroller General is not in
fact subservient to Congress. To the extent that the majority
responded to these arguments, its reasoning has a marked ipse
dixit quality. The analysis reflects none of the sensitive assess-
ments of one branch's intrusion into the responsibilities of an-
other that have marked other important separation-of-powers
decisions. For example, the Court did not inquire into "the
"IS The President selects the Comptroller General from a list of three persons
recommended by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate.
31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2) (1982). The propriety of this procedure was not at issue in the
Bowsher litigation.
-6 106 S. Ct. at 3188, 3190-91. See supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
From this perspective, it is entirely irrelevant that the statutory restriction upon the
grounds for removal, if effective to limit congressional discretion, could be seen as
enhancing the Comptroller General's independence from legislative control. See 106 S.
Ct. at 3195 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 3211 (vhite, J., dissenting).
27 Even Justice White, who criticized the majority for relying upon "the rigid
dogma" that the Constitution prohibits Congress from participating directly in the
removal of officers who perform executive duties, 106 S. Ct. at 3214 (vhite, J.,
dissenting), previously had found nothing in the precedents suggesting that Congress
"itself [could] ... remove [members of regulatory agencies] without the participation
of the Executive Branch of the Government." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 277 (1976)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). On this
reasoning, Bowsher should have been an a fortiori case because, by Justice White's own
admission, the officer in question was executing a law that Congress had passed. See
106 S. Ct. at 3208 (White, J., dissenting). That Bowsher was not such a case for Justice
White suggests an underlying complexity to the problem that the majority opinion, even
if it reached the correct result, managed to ignore.
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extent to which [the removal provision] prevents the Executive
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions, ' 278 nor did it consider whether maintenance of a unitary
executive requires "an absolute, unqualified" exclusion of Con-
gress from the removal process. 279 Further, the opinion reflects
no serious effort to balance the competing interests of the leg-
islative and executive branches. 20 Therefore, however correct its
conclusion, the Court's analysis reveals a "distressingly formal-
istic view of separation of powers."' l This is the more unfor-
tunate because no textual provision expressly addresses the issue
at hand; Bowsher required the interpretation of one of the "great
silences of the Constitution.' '2,2
The point, in brief, is not that the decision necessarily is
wrong, but simply that it is unpersuasive. No one suggests that
the Court abstain from resolving disputes over the removal
power. 23 In light of the magnitude of the legislation involved in
the case, however, one might have hoped for a more sophisti-
cated explanation of the reasons for the Court's disposition of
the issues before it. At the same time, those who may be dis-
appointed by the quality of the opinion at least may take some
2' Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
: United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
See, e.g., id. at 707-13; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
106 S. Ct. at 3205 (White, J., dissenting).
2 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
Even Justice White, who attacked the Chief Justice's analysis at almost every
turn, would have held only that separation-of-powers disputes, such as the wisdom of
conferring executive powers upon an official removable by joint resolution or of au-
thorizing an unelected official to make binding cuts in the federal budget, were "for the
most part to be worked out between Congress and the President through the legislative
process." 106 S. Ct. at 3214 (Vhite, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Unfortunately,
Justice White did not explain the meaning of his qualification; he suggested only that
this was an inappropriate case for judicial resolution because he could see "no real
danger of aggrandizement of congressional power." Id.
Dean Choper, the foremost academic advocate of judicial abstention from separa-
tion-of-powers disputes, nonetheless would have the courts award compensation to
officials who were wrongfully ousted from their positions. He simply would leave the
resolution of the issue of constitutional power to remove to political accommodation.
J. CHOPER, supra note 24, at 331-33. It is not entirely clear how the judiciary could
avoid at least an implicit ruling on the underlying constitutional question, since an award
of back salary would require a prior determination that the discharged official was
entitled to remain in office.
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consolation from the Chief Justice's refusal to accept the broad-
est argument made by the executive branch. That theory, if
accepted, would have called into question many of the assump-
tions upon which the modern administrative state is based.
C. The President, the Removal Power, and the Concept of
Administrative Independence
The Bowsher decision was awaited with great anticipation in
part because it concerned the means by which the federal gov-
ernment could deal with the budget deficit, one of the central
political issues of the day. The case had broader ramifications,
however, because the executive branch argued that Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings was invalid not only because Congress alone could
remove the Comptroller General, but also because the President
lacked the unfettered authority to discharge an official perform-
ing executive functions. 214 This argument, which reflects the
King's-party philosophy underlying Myers, 2 5 coupled with some
broad language in the district court's opinion, 286 raised questions
about the constitutionality of a large number of "independent"
agencies. Acceptance of the argument held out the prospect of
a significant restructuring of the federal government. Careful
analysis suggests two conclusions. First, the concept of genuinely
independent administrative agencies oversimplies reality. Second,
statutory provisions at issue in Bowsher and Humphrey's Exec-
utor, which limit the grounds for removing administrators, play
a comparatively minor role in affording some agencies relatively
greater freedom from political controls than others enjoy and
therefore do not violate the Constitution.
1. The Concept of "Independent" Agencies
In recent years, it has become commonplace to refer to
administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission
as "independent." In fact, Congress has formally so character-
ized some agencies, presumably to contrast them with "execu-
n' See Brief for the United States at 44-51; Reply Brief for the United States at 2-
3.
235 See supra text accompanying note 170.
2 See infra text accompanying note 289.
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tive" bodies. 28 Although the term "independent agency" appears
nowhere in the Humphrey's Executor opinion, the concept is
derived from Justice Sutherland's statement that the FTC was
created as "a body which shall be independent of executive
authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment
without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any
department of the government."'' 5
The district court suggested that the experience of the half-
century since those words were written has called into question
the assumption that a group of expert administrators can make
truly impartial decisions unaffected by political considerations.
That court further noted that certain language in Chadha is at
least arguably inconsistent with the Humphrey's Executor anal-
ysis. 2S9 While the government cited this language approvingly, it
did not press the Court specifically to repudiate Justice Suther-
land's reasoning. 290 Others have argued, however, that the Con-
stitution prohibits the creation of agencies over which the
President lacks direct control and that unfettered removal au-
thority is essential to such control. 29' The implications of such a
drastic step elicited extensive discussion at oral argument in
Bowsher 92 and prompted Chief Justice Burger to add a footnote
to his opinion disavowing any intention to cast doubt upon the
constitutional status of the independent agencies.2 93
11 In addition to the FTC, "independent" agencies include the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Reserve Board,
the Federal Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the
National Labor Relations Board, among others. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). Sometimes Congress combines the two terms. For example, the Energy
Research and Development Administration is denominated "an independent executive
agency." 42 U.S.C. § 5811 (1982).
2 295 U.S. at 625-26 (emphasis in original).
626 F. Supp. at 1398-99.
Brief for the United States at 46 n.32. But see Rabin, supra note 181, at 1319
n.471 (citing statements by Attorney General Meese that concept of independent regu-
latory agencies is inconsistent with separation-of-powers doctrine).
"I E.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 39-63, Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814
F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Note, supra note 235, at 1775, 1777, 1780-81, 1785.
2'Z This issue was of particular concern to Justice O'Connor. See 54 U.S.L.W. 3710
(1986) (summary of oral argument).
1, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 n.4. This footnote, however, did not foreclose such a
constitutional challenge. The Court simply stated that "It]his case involves nothing like"
19871
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From a strictly analytical perspective, however, it has become
increasingly difficult to distinguish independent from executive
agencies. Both types of agencies are equally subject to the general
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.294 Similarly,
both types of agencies engage in adjudication, the quasi-judicial
function that loomed so large for the Court in Humphrey's
Executor.295 Moreover, both types of agencies engage in rule-
making, which has become the predominant method for the
formulation of administrative policy during the past genera-
tion.296 Finally, the agencies undertake these activities with the
apparent approval of the Supreme Court.
297
Even if one could distinguish independent from executive
agencies, however, questions respecting the significance of the
distinction would remain. Two examples illustrate this point.
statutes permitting removal by the President for specified causes or laws which are silent
on the entire subject.
In a case decided the same day as Bowsher, the Court implied that the constitu-
tionality of the independent agencies may be somewhat more secure than this ambiguous
footnote suggests. That case upheld the authority of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to adjudicate common-law counterclaims in reparations proceedings even
though that body is not an article III tribunal. CFTC v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
The Commission is "an independent agency of the United States Government." 7 U.S.C.
§ 4(a)(1) (1982); see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1982). The CFTC's organic statute does
not limit the grounds for removal, however, so Schor cannot resolve the constitutional
ambiguity left open by the Bowsher footnote.
4 The APA defines an "agency" as "each authority of the Government of the
United States," subject to certain exceptions that do not implicate the distinction between
"independent" and "executive" bodies. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1982).
29 See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 472 n.198 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) ("there has been a general breakdown in any distinction between the functions
of the two types of agency"), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); J. MASAvW, BuRnAucAInc JusTICE
18 (1983) (noting extensive system of adjudication undertaken by Social Security Admin-
istration, located within executive branch as part of Department of Health and Human
Services); Nathanson, supra note 93, at 1101; Note, supra note 235, at 1771-72.
216 See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 472 n.198 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy
Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); Nathanson, supra note 93, at 1101; Scalia, Vermont
Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. Rnv. 345,
376; Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking,
38 An. L. Rav. 181, 203-05 (1986); Note, supra note 235, at 1771-72.
-9 See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986) (upholding agency authority
to resolve state-law counterclaims in administrative adjudication proceeding); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (distinguishing administrative rulemaking by
agencies from lawmaking that must be performed by Congress).
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The National Transportation Safety Board was established as
part of the Department of Transportation, an executive depart-
ment, to investigate accidents and hear various appeals.29 Nine
years later, Congress transformed the Board into "an independ-
ent agency of the United States" without altering its statutory
responsibilities in any way.2 99 It is not at all clear that this change
had any substantive significance on the activities of the Board.
More to the point, it is not apparent why the change should
have made any legally important difference in the status of the
agency. 3°°
1 Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 5, 80 Stat. 931, 935
(1966).
^1 Transportation Safety Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, § 303(a), 88 Stat. 2156,
2167 (1975) (codified at 49 U.S.C. App. § 1902(a) (1982).
?- See S. BRE1ER & R. STE ,vART, ArDmIsmTRATv LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
122 & n.81 (2d ed. 1985).
The lower courts generally have looked to the function an official performs rather
than to the formal location of the agency in resolving removal disputes that have arisen
since Humphrey's Executor. See, e.g., Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941); Martin v. Reagan, 525 F. Supp. 110, 113 (D.
Mass. 1981) (member of advisory board of National Institute of Justice); Borders v.
Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250, 255-64 (D.D.C. 1981) (member of District of Columbia Judicial
Nominating Commission), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lewis
v. Carter, 436 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D.D.C. 1977) (member of Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission); Farley v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl. 672, 674, 139 F. Supp. 757,
758 (United States marshal), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956). Cf. Nader v. Bork, 366
F. Supp. 104, 107-09 (D.D.C. 1973) (declaring unlawful the discharge of Archibald Cox
as Watergate Special Prosecutor on grounds that the attorney general rather than the
President had appointed Cox and that his discharge violated valid regulation promulgated
by the attorney general limiting grounds for removal to "extraordinary impropriety,"
grounds which had not been asserted in this instance).
Morgan was a suit for back pay arising from President Roosevelt's removal of the
chairman of the board of the TVA who refused either to withdraw allegations of
corruption against fellow board members or to assist in the resolution of the resulting
controversy that had brought the board to a standstill. See L. FISHER, supra note 61, at
79; C. RossnTER, supra note 236, at 21. The statute creating the TVA, adopted after
Myers but before Humphrey's Executor, provided for removal of board members by
concurrent resolution of Congress at any time or, only in cases involving unlawful hiring
on the basis of political patronage, by the President. The court of appeals avoided
resolution of the constitutionality of these removal provisions by holding the TVA to
be an essentially executive agency, thereby distinguishing Humphrey's Executor and
bringing the case within the Myers rule permitting the President to dismiss executive
officers. For criticism of this decision, see Larson, Has the President an Inherent Power
of Removal of His Non-Executive Appointees?, 16 TENN. L. Rav. 259 (1940).
Farley also rejected a claim for back pay by a federal marshal whom the President
removed before the end of his statutory term. The court held that the marshal performed
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The uncertain meaning of administrative independence is
further exemplified by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights. This agency was established "in the executive branch of
the Government" by the Civil Rights Act of 1957. °10 The statute
did not specify how long members would serve and said nothing
about removal. When President Reagan attempted to replace
three members of the Commission in 1983, numerous critics
charged that he was interfering with the agency's independ-
ence.30 2 Two of the affected Commissioners secured a temporary
wholly executive functions of a ministerial nature and thus could be dismissed without
formal cause. One of the government lawyers in this case, by the way, was then-Assistant
Attorney General Warren Burger. Neither the various opinions nor any of the parties
and amici curiae cited this decision in Bowsher. See also supra note 227 (discussing the
Chief Justice's involvement in Wiener).
In each of the other cases, officials sought to enjoin their dismissal. In Martin, the
district court denied an injunction against the discharge of a member of a Department
of Justice advisory board. Instead, the court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment because the board performed purely executive functions. Similarly,
in Lewis, the district court denied an injunction that would have allowed a member of
the EEOC whose term had expired to retain his office until his successor had qualified.
The court emphasized that the Commission's limited quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions were insufficient to justify equitable relief.
Only in Borders was an injunction granted to prevent removal. The district court
emphasized that the agency in question was responsible for recommending persons for
appointment as judges and that the structure and legislative history of the relevant
statute demonstrated congressional intent to insulate the local courts in the District of
Columbia from political pressure. Ironically, this case was rendered moot when the
plaintiff resigned his office following his conviction for conspiracy to bribe a federal
judge. Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1982, at A16.
One exception to the focus upon the functions performed by the agency involved
the unsuccessful effort of two members of the Benefits Review Board to prevent their
ouster. In that case, the court placed some significance upon the location of the agency,
a part of the Department of Labor, in the executive branch. Kalaris v. Donovan, 697
F.2d 376, 395 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983). At the same time, the
court underscored that the Secretary of Labor, not the President, appointed the members
of the Benefits Review Board, thereby rendering them inferior officers, and that the
statute under which they were appointed did not fix the term of their service. Thus, this
case was analogous to Shurtleff. 697 F.2d at 396, 398. The court conceded that the
members of the Board performed adjudicative functions but ruled that this fact alone
did not require that they be insulated from all political supervision. Whether these
officials could render appropriately impartial judgments presented a question of due
process for litigants, not an issue of separation of powers that warranted an injunction
protecting the members of the Board from dismissal. Id. at 399 n.21.
301 Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 101(a), 71 Stat. 634.
m See, e.g., Presidential Nominations to the Civil Rights Commission: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 32 (1983) (statement
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injunction to block their dismissal, although the litigation was
overtaken by events. 303
The argument that the Commission was independent rested
in large part upon various statements in the legislative history.
3°4
of Sen. Biden); id. at 33, 35 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); id. at 37-38 (statement
of Sen. Leahy); id. at 40-41 (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at 54, 56 (statement of
Rep. Garcia); id. at 57-58 (statement of Rep. Richardson); id. at 68 (statement of Rep.
Dixon); id. at 174-75, 176, 177-78 (statement of Judy Goldsmith, president, National
Organization for Women); id. at 180-81, 182 (statement of Amoldo Torres, national
executive director, League of United Latin American Citizens); id. at 195-96 (statement
of Arkee Byrd, staff attorney, Women's Legal Defense Fund); id. at 196, 198-99, 201
(statement of Joaquin Avila, president, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund); id. at 204, 205-06, 207 (statement of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.); id. at 209,
210-11 (statement of Maudine Cooper, vice-president, National Urban League); id. at
219, 220, 221, 455 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 271 (statement of Julius L.
Chambers, president, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund); id. at 279 (state-
ment of Diann Rust-Tierney, staff attorney, National Women's Law Center); id. at 287
(statement of Leonel Castillo, National Association of Social Workers); id. at 293, 294
(statement of Martha Escutia, legislative director, National Council of La Raza); id. at
306, 312, 318, 320 (statement of William L. Taylor); id. at 348, 349 (statement of
Virginia Apuzzo, executive director, National Gay Task Force); id. at 353, 358 (statement
of Stephen M. Levinson, National Association of Human Rights Workers); id. at 362
(statement of John H. Buchanan, Jr., People for the American Way); id. at 366
(statement of Joyce B. Hamlin, Women's Division, Department of Economic and Social
Justice, Methodist Church); id. at 369 (statement of Faith Evans, Office of Church in
Society and Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ); id. at 462
(statement of Sen. Specter); id. at 466 (statement of Jan Hartke, director, Washington
office, State of New Mexico).
?, Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,898 (D.D.C.), vacated as
moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The case became moot when the statutory life of
the Commission expired. Congress shortly afterward passed new legislation reconstituting
the agency and requiring cause for removal of any of its members. United States
Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-183, 97 Stat. 1301 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975f (Supp. III 1985)).
3- The references to the Commission's independence in the legislative history of
the 1957 Act involved complaints that the agency would not be subject to congressional
control. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 53 (Additional Minority
Views) (describing Commission as "a body over which we will have no future control"),
reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1966, 2008; see also 103 CONG. REc.
11237 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Johnston) (referring to "an independent commission in
the executive branch"); id. at 16233 (remarks of Sen. Eastland) ("an independent
executive Commission divorced entirely from the control and direction of Congress").
The concept of agency independence derived from Humphrey's Executor, however,
relates to insulation from presidential control.
The many references to the Commission's independence in this more traditional
sense generally appeared in later years. Most of these statements were contained in
committee reports recommending authorizations or appropriations for the operation of
the agency. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. H8843 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983) (remarks of Rep.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Unfortunately, these statements do not define this crucial term,
and they are contradicted by others characterizing the agency as
"executive" or "presidential. "305
Another basis for viewing the Commission as independent
was its temporary nature. The original statute provided that the
agency would cease to exist in two years. 306 By analogy to
Wiener, where the three-year life of the War Claims Commission
Fish); S. REP. No. 706, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 969, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1980); S. REP. No. 167, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 109,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979); H.R. R.E. No. 1140, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2639, 2640; S. REP. No. 324, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977); S. REP. No. 223, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977); S. REP. No. 1006, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3621, 3623; H.R.
REP. No. 946, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972); Letter from Theodore M. Hesburgh to
Hon. Carl Albert, Apr. 1, 1971, reprinted in S. REP. No. 293, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1971); H.R. REP. No. 179, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 1339, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 4772, 4772; S.
REP. No. 704, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 9, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2178, 2178, 2184; H.R. REtP. No. 389, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1967). Others were
found in reports investigating alleged irregularities in the performance of the Commission
or its staff and in confirmation hearings for COmmission nominees. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 439, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 SENATE REPORT]; Members of
the Commission on Civil Rights: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("This Commission, when
established, becomes its own boss.... I thought this was to be an independent com-
mission.").
How much interpretive weight these later statements deserve is unclear. In general,
the Supreme Court has discounted such post-enactment legislative history. See, e.g.,
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980); Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304,
313 (1960). Nevertheless, the Court occasionally has found some value in such material,
particularly when the intent of the enacting Congress was ambiguous. See, e.g., Bell v.
New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 (1983); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444
U.S. 572, 596 (1980).
10 See, e.g., 103 CONG. REc. 8663 (1957) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) ("the Presi-
dent's commission"); id. at 8847 (remarks of Rep. Forrester) ("a Presidential commis-
sion"); id. at 13458 (remarks of Sen. Kefauver) (contrasting the "[g]reater independence"
of a commission located in the legislative branch than of the "purely executive agency"
proposed by the ultimately enacted bill); id. at 13726 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge) ("an
executive agency"); id. at 13729 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (a "Presidential Commission");
id. at 13835 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) ("a part of the executive branch of the Govern-
ment"); id. at 13870 (remarks of Sen. Potter) ("a President's Commission"); id. at
16233 (remarks of Sen. Eastland) ("a roving Presidential Commission"). See also H.R.
REP. No. 2187, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1956) (Additional Minority Views) (character-
izing Commission proposed in bill that served as model for legislation enacted by the
following Congress as "purely executive").
Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 104(b)-(c), 71 Stat. 634, 635.
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was regarded as evidence of congressional intent to restrict the
President's power to remove, the short term provided for the
Civil Rights Commission was invoked against unfettered execu-
tive discretion to remove. 0 7 Congress, however, repeatedly ex-
tended the life of the Commission over the next quarter-century
and, when the removal controversy erupted, was considering
another long-term extension.308 Thus, although in form the agency
was temporary, as a practical matter it would remain in opera-
tion for the foreseeable future.
3 9
A third argument for independence was that the Commission
had duties to Congress as well as to the President. Those duties,
to recommend appropriate changes in federal law, were essen-
tially the same as those that the Court in Humphrey's Executor
characterized as quasi-legislative. The statute creating the Civil
Rights Commission differed significantly, however, from the one
establishing the Federal Trade Commission. The Civil Rights Act
of 1957 said nothing about removal, whereas the FTC Act
specifically limited the grounds upon which members of the
agency could be discharged. The Court in Humphrey's Executor
identified the FTC's quasi-legislative duties only to explain why
Congress constitutionally could so restrict the President. Nothing
in the opinion implies that officials who perform such duties
must be protected against dismissal without cause.
The silence of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 on the subject
of removal made the situation more analogous to Wiener, where
the statute creating the agency also said nothing about this
question, than to Humphrey's Executor. The functions per-
formed by the Civil Rights Commission were quite different
I...See Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,893, at 31,307 (D.D.C.),
vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
' See H.R. REP. No. 197, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1989, 1989-90.
- The formally limited existence of the Commission might suggest, however, a
restriction upon the otherwise unlimited terms of its members. The district court so
reasoned in granting the temporary injunction blocking President Reagan from dismissing
two Commissioners in 1983. Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,893, at
31,307 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983). This reasoning offered
little comfort to the plaintiffs in that case because the suit was filed slightly over one
month before the Commission was scheduled to go out of existence. See 32 Empl. Prac.
Dec. at 31,304. whether or not the district court correctly analyzed this question, the
case became moot when the Commission's life expired. See 732 F.2d at 949.
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from those assigned to the War Claims Commission. The Civil
Rights Commission was charged only with recommending changes
in federal law based upon its research and investigations; it had
no authority to adjudicate any matter whatsoever. 310 Accord-
ingly, concern that presidential intrusion into the workings of
the agency might compromise the due process rights of third
parties, which played a prominent role in the Court's reasoning
in Wiener, had much less force in this context. 31' Humphrey's
Executor suggests that Congress might have limited the grounds
upon which the President could remove members of the Com-
mission. The legislative branch did not do so, however. Thus,
the argument that members of this agency enjoyed an implied
protection against removal without cause is not persuasive.
Finally, the placement of the Civil Rights Commission in the
executive branch suggested its lack of independence and there-
fore implied unfettered presidential removal authority.3 2 Yet the
310 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440-41 (1960).
The original legislation authorized the Commission to investigate sworn, written
complaints asserting the denial of voting rights on grounds of race, religion, or national
origin, to collect information on legal developments relating to discrimination based
upon race, religion, or national origin, and to appraise federal antidiscrimination policies.
Subsequently, the Commission's duties were expanded to encompass discrimination based
upon age, sex, and handicap and to make the agency a national clearinghouse for
information on these matters. Those duties were carried over without change in the 1983
legislation that reconstituted the agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(a) (Supp. III 1985).
311 See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 218-20 and
accompanying text; Hearings, supra note 302, at 424-31 (statement of Prof. Cass R.
Sunstein).
312 Past practice suggests that the Commission itself has not been of one view on
this subject. All of the Commissioners tendered their resignations when President Ken-
nedy assumed office in 1961 and again when President Johnson succeeded him in 1963.
The resignations were rejected, however. F. DuLI.s, THE CivM RiGTs ComISION:
1957-1965, at 99, 214-15 (1968). In addition, the agency's first staff director, who had
been under fire from congressional opponents of federal civil rights efforts, resigned
early in 1961 "with the change of national administrations." 1961 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 304, at 11. The staff director has always been appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Following the 1964 election, an aide to President Johnson once more sought pro
forma resignations from the members. All but one of the Commissioners complied. The
dissenter, Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard Law School, thought that compliance
"would be an acknowledgement that we are not an independent agency, but are merely
a part of the Presidential staff, holding office at the pleasure of the President. I do not
think that that is either the legal or factual situation." Hesburgh, Integer Vitae: Inde-
pendence of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 46 No=n DmAi LAW. 445,
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political context in which the agency was created militates against
a facile conclusion that either Congress or the President even
considered the question of removal. Before the 1957 Act which
created the Commission, no federal civil rights law had been
adopted since 1875. 313 Several proposals for a federal civil rights
commission had been rejected in the immediately preceding
years.3 14 Supporters of civil rights legislation wanted to pass
almost any bill at all, no matter how mild and ineffectual, and
regarded creation of the Commission as a reasonable first step
toward their eventual goal of a comprehensive statute.315 Pro-
ponents were especially concerned that the Commission would
be undermined or destroyed unless it could be insulated from
454 (1971). Only two of the six members of the Commission resigned when President
Nixon took office. In 1972, however, Father Hesburgh tendered his resignation in
response to a presidential request.
"I Between 1933 and 1956, numerous civil rights bills were introduced in Congress
but none passed. See 103 CONG. REc. 13893-94 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Knowand)
(listing disposition of every civil rights proposal from 73d to 84th Congresses).
14 For example, the year before, the House passed a bill that would have created
such a commission. 102 CONG. REC. 13999 (1956). The bill was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, id. at 13937, which was chaired by Sen. James Eastland, a staunch
segregationist, and well-populated with other similarly disposed members who made the
Committee "the graveyard of civil rights legislation." C. & B. WHALEN, Tim LONGEST
DEBATE 4 (1985). Not surprisingly, no further action was taken on the House bill. H.R.
REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957). See generally J. ANDERSON, EISENHOWER,
BROWNELL, AND TiE CONGRESS 45-109 (1964).
President Truman unsuccessfully sought passage of a similar statute in 1948. H.R.
Doc. No. 516, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 94 CoNG. REc. 927, 928 (1948).
"I See, e.g., 103 CONG. REc. 8488 (1957) (remarks of Rep. Chudoff); id. (remarks
of Rep. Machrowicz); id. at 8498 (remarks of Rep. Keating); id. at 8499 (remarks of
Rep. Rodino); id. at 8651 (remarks of Rep. Vanik); id. at 9391 (remarks of Rep.
Dollinger); id. at 12878 (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id. at 13462 (remarks of Sen.
McNamara); id. at 13727, 13867, 13879 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 13731 (remarks
of Sen. Carroll); id. at 13738 (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney); id. at 13832 (remarks of
Sen. Neuberger); id. at 13833 (remarks of Sen. Murray); id. at 13841 (remarks of Sen.
Aiken); id. at 13841-42 (remarks of Sen. Douglas); id. at 13842-43 (remarks of Sen.
Francis Case); id. at 13851 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 13854 (remarks of Sen.
Bush); id. at 13867 (remarks of Sen. Clifford Case); id. at 13873 (remarks of Sen.
Watkins); id. at 13877 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); id. at 13883 (remarks of Sen. AllotO;
id. at 13884 (remarks of Sen. Purtell); id. at 13885 (remarks of Sen. Cooper); id. at
16088 (remarks of Rep. Brown); id. at 16089 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 16093
(remarks of Rep. Scott); id. at 16099 (remarks of Rep. Diggs); id. (remarks of Rep.
Roosevelt); id. at 16101 (remarks of Rep. Laurence Curtis); id. at 16110 (remarks of
Rep. Boland); id. at 16111 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara).
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direct attacks by hostile members of Congress.316 Placement of
the agency in the executive branch thus was a tactic entirely
unrelated to the issue of presidential removal authority.317
The political decision concerning the location of the Civil
Rights Commission supports the observation of the district court
in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings litigation that "independence
from the President ... entail[s] correspondingly greater depend-
ence upon the committees of Congress to which they are then
immediately accountable. ' 318 For example, Congress consistently
has refused to make the Commission permanent, thereby re-
quiring the agency periodically to justify its existence. 3 9 Simi-
larly, the Commission has been subjected to unusually stringent
316 See, e.g., id. at 13459 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); id. (remarks of Sen. Javits).
The defeat of numerous prior civil rights bills through parliamentarymaneuvering
and delay made this a well-founded concern. See supra note 313. Subsequent attacks
upon the Commission and its staff by congressional opponents also justified those
concerns. See, e.g., F. Duuas, supra note 312, at 22-26, 64, 81-85, 101-03, 192-93, 218-
19.
317 The question of authority to dismiss members of the Commission was not
mentioned anywhere in the legislative history of the 1957 Act. The only reference to the
issue in the debate on the 1956 bill, upon which the original version of the 1957 Act
was based, was the following statement made in the course of a discussion of the
procedural rules under which the Commission would operate:
inhere is a difference between the rules which are offered for a legislative
committee and the rules which are offered for a committee of the admin-
istrative branch of the Government. In the first place, these men are
appointed by the President, and any time they did not conform to fair
play and fair rules the President undoubtedly would remove them.
102 CONG. Rc. 13179 (1956) (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt) (emphasis added). The context
of this statement makes it unclear whether the speaker thought that the President would
have plenary authority to remove Commissioners for any reason or that failure to
"conform to fair play and fair rules" would constitute cause for removal.
318 626 F. Supp. at 1398.
Additional support for this proposition may be gleaned from the recent experience
of the Federal Trade Commission. Over the past decade, largely due to dissatisfaction
with the policies of the agency, Congress has subjected the FTC to a variety of stringent
procedural and substantive restrictions. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). At one point, the agency was required
to shut down briefly until additional funds were appropriated for its operations. See
generally Baer, Where to From Here: Reflections on the Recent Saga of the Federal
Trade Commission, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 51, 53-54 (1986); Gellhorn, The Wages of Zealotry:
The FTC Under Siege, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 33.
319 The current extension expires on November 30, 1989. See 42 U.S.C. § 1975f
(Supp. III 1985).
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procedural requirements applicable to few, if any, other agen-
cies.320 These considerations strongly suggest that the meaning
of the concept of independence remains murky and that its
significance for any particular agency may be considerably ex-
aggerated. Whether they also support suggestions that Hum-
phrey's Executor be reconsidered remains to be seen.
2. The Significance of the Removal Power
The preceding discussion suggests the evanescence of the
distinction between independent and executive agencies. That in
turn implies that there should be no special principles governing
the removal of members of the so-called independent agencies.
This conclusion, however, does not define what general princi-
ples should govern removals from functionally identical posi-
tions.
The view that the Constitution requires that the President
have an absolutely free hand in dismissing all of his nonjudicial
appointees rests upon an expansive conception of presidential
power. Since the Constitution established a unitary executive,
the theory goes, the President is entitled to exercise every aspect
of executive power, either personally or through agents and
subordinates who are responsible to him personally. Moreover,
it is "the power of removal-the 'gun behind the door'-that
makes it possible for the President to bend his 'team' to his
will." '32' And because the chief executive is exclusively responsi-
-M' The most notable of these restrictions relates to the Commission's powers of
compulsory process. This provision prohibits the agency from issuing any subpoena
requiring a witness to attend a hearing or to produce documents more than 50 miles
from that person's home or principal place of business. The 50-mile limitation is waived
only if the place of testimony or production is located within the target's home state.
42 U.S.C. § 1975a(k) (Supp. 111 1985). This restriction was adopted as a compromise
measure to promote passage of the original bill, 103 CoNr. REc. 8866 (1957) (remarks
of Reps. Keating and Celler), and has remained on the books. By contrast, most agencies
may require attendance of witnesses and production of documents at any designated
place in the country. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 499m(b), 2115, 2717 (1982) (Department of
Agriculture); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n) (1982) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77s(b), 77uuu(a), 78u(b), 79r(c), 80a-41(b), 80b-9(b) (1982) (Securities and Exchange
Commission); 47 U.S.C. § 409(f) (1982) (Federal Communications Commission); 49
U.S.C. § 10321(c)(1) (1982) (Interstate Commerce Commission).
' C. RossrrER, supra note 236, at 20.
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ble for the actions of these officials, he must have the sole and
unbridled power to dismiss them.
As an empirical proposition, however, this model of presi-
dential power is dubious. For example, numerous officials within
the executive branch exercise their authority pursuant to statutes
which insulate their decisions from presidential direction or in-
terference, while others are protected effectively against removal
by virtue of their strong political support in Congress or among
powerful interest groups. 322 Moreover, no President has suc-
ceeded in imposing uniform direction over the executive branch. 32
This failure has resulted, somewhat paradoxically, from the
growth of the executive branch itself, including the White House
staff, the Executive Office of the President, and new and existing
agencies, as well as from increasingly frequent statutory limita-
tions upon executive action. 32 Finally, advocates of broad pres-
idential power often overlook the political advantages to the
chief executive of leaving minor or potentially controversial de-
cisions to others.
325
Although these empirical observations probably were legally
irrelevant, it is not at all clear that the existence of statutory
removal-for-cause provisions impairs the President's removal au-
thority. No chief executive has ever sought to dismiss for cause
any official who enjoyed the protection of such a statute. 32 1 This
fact does not imply necessarily that the existence of such statutes
has required Presidents to retain persons whom they found
,2 See S. BREYER & R. STEWAmT, supra note 300, at 123-24; L. FIsHER, supra note
61, at 98; C. RossrrER, supra note 236, at 246-47.
1 R. NEUSTADT, supra note 4, at 199-200, 203; C. RossrrER, supra note 236, at
19; W. TAr, supra note 168, at 83-85; Heclo, One Executive Branch or Many?, in
BOTH ENDS OF TRa AvauE 26, 27 (A. King ed. 1983).
314 R. NEUSTADT, supra note 4, at 30-32, 212-14; Schick, Politics through Law:
Congressional Limitations on Executive Discretion, in BOTH ENDS OF TE AVw.rU 154,
155-61, 166-70 (A. King ed. 1983).
"I See R. NEUSTADT, supra note 4, at 115-16, 200, 211 (observing that Franklin D.
Roosevelt benefited from his intuitive understanding of this point, whereas Richard
Nixon and Jimmy Carter got themselves into various kinds of difficulty because they
failed to appreciate the advantages of decentralized decisionmaking).
12 Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLuM. L. Rsv. 943, 955 (1980).
The only recorded instance in which a President has moved against such an official
is Humphrey's Executor, and in that case the President did not invoke any of the
statutory grounds for removal.
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unsatisfactory. No President has tried to fire any member of the
Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission, or the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, although these commissioners have no statutory protection
against removal without cause. 27 The explanation is not that
members of these agencies consistently have avoided impro-
priety. 321 Rather, as the controversy over the Civil Rights Com-
mission demonstrates, chief executives incur costs whenever they
oust someone, even when no cause need be shown; the nomi-
nation of a successor affords congressional and other opponents
of the action a forum for criticism.329 Thus, even if a for-cause
requirement theoretically makes removals somewhat more diffi-
cult, 330 it does not follow that protection of appointed officials
against entirely arbitrary discharge really impairs the authority
of the President.
331
Moreover, the formal rules governing the power to remove
pale into insignificance when compared to the many other re-
- W. GEaLsoRN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, CASES AND COMMENTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 131 (7th ed. 1979).
-.- For example, FCC Commissioner Richard Mack resigned in 1958 following
congressional revelation of apparent conflicts of interest between his official duties and
his personal financial dealings. See L. FisnRa, supra note 61, at 96-97; C. RossrrER,
supra note 236, at 20.
Accord W. CARy, PoLiTics AND =HE REGuLATORY AGENCiES 10 (1967) (noting
that "the political inadvisability of such a traumatic step" reduces the efficacy of using
removals as a means for asserting presidential control over agencies).
-1 One additional hurdle that a removal-for-cause statute might create is a require-
ment of a pretermination hearing. The Budget and Accounting Act expressly affords the
Comptroller the opportunity for such a hearing. See supra text accompanying note 237.
Most other removal-for-cause statutes, including the provision of the FTC Act at issue
in Humphrey's Executor, are silent on this question. Any official whose ouster was
predicated upon statutorily defined cause probably would assert a right to such a hearing
on the basis of language to that effect in two pre-Myers removal cases, see Shurtleff v.
United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1903); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 426
(1901), and by analogy to decisions addressing the procedural due process rights of
public employees at the state and local level, see, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). If a
pretermination hearing were required, additional questions would remain respecting the
formality of the proceeding, the allocation of the burden of proof, and related issues.
See Verkuil, supra note 326, at 955 & n.73.
-'1 Some scholars believe that such a requirement may be applied even to members
of the cabinet, while others do not. See supra note 216. Whatever the answer to that
question, it cannot resolve the debate over the constitutionality of adopting removal-
for-cause statutes applicable to the members of administrative agencies, whether formally
located within the executive branch or not, who do not serve as advisors to the President.
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sources that the chief executive can bring to bear to control
administrative behavior. At the most basic level, the President
has various devices through which he can persuade officials more
or less voluntarily to resign.3 12 In addition, the power to appoint
the members of administrative agencies affords an important
means of shaping agency policy, a means Presidents rarely have
used. 3 3 Other mechanisms available to the chief executive include
designation of the chairman of many agencies, control over
budget requests, formal or informal involvement in the selection
of important agency staff members, introduction of substantive
legislation affecting agency jurisdiction and policies, and pro-
mulgation of reorganization plans.
3 3 4
In short, the substantive importance to the President of
unfettered removal authority is modest indeed. The suggestion
that removal-for-cause statutes are as suspect under the Consti-
tution as are laws that give Congress a direct role in the removal
process is, at best, "not convincing. ' ' 335 Indeed, as previously
332 Presidential requests for resignation are rarely ignored. Even when an initial
request is rebuffed, additional White House pressure may prompt an official ultimately
to comply. President Ford used this approach to obtain the resignation of a member of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1975. See L. FisHR, supra note 61, at 91-92; W.
GEL1ORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAuss, supra note 327, at 130 n.6. Members of Congress
also may involve themselves, sometimes with the tacit approval of the chief executive,
either through embarrassing committee hearings or simply through public criticism. For
example, President Eisenhower demanded and obtained the resignation of FCC Com-
missioner Mack following a congressional investigation. See supra note 328. For other
examples of successful legislative efforts to force the ouster of high-ranking executive
officials, see L. FISHER, supra note 61, at 96-97.
Of course, not all requests for resignation are honored, as Humphrey's Executor
clearly demonstrates. See also W. GELLHoRN, C. BYSE & P. STRAuss, supra note 327, at
130 n.6 (discussing refusal of member of Commodity Futures Trading Commission to
accede to President Carter's demand for resignation).
S. BREYER & R. STmwART, supra note 300, at 124; A. & 0. HoooENmooM, supra
note 105, at 182-84, 187-89; Bruff, supra note 165, at 463 n.56; Robinson, The Federal
Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. Rnv. 169,
184, 187-88 (1978).
The significance of the power to appoint is magnified by the frequency with which
members of administrative agencies depart before the end of their terms. Even for
agencies with terms ranging from five to seven years, Presidents typically are able to
appoint a majority of commissioners within two years of taking office. Goodsell &
Gayo, Appointive Control of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 ADMIN. L. REy. 291,
295-96 (1971).
3" See generally S. BREER & R. STWART, supra note 300, at 124-25; Bruff, supra
note 165, at 491-95.
331 Strauss, supra note 74, at 614.
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noted, it is not altogether clear that every statute that gives the
legislative branch a limited role in removals runs afoul of the
separation-of-powers doctrine.11
6
If the chief executive exercises less direct authority over the
so-called independent agencies than over those agencies explicitly
located within the executive branch, he does so for reasons
having almost nothing to do with the formal rules governing
removals. This does not mean that the power to discharge is
itself unimportant; someone must have that authority if the
government is to function properly. Under our Constitution, by
way of practice and of judicial construction, that power belongs
to the President. Except as to officials who perform substantial
adjudicative functions or who serve as intimate advisors to the
chief executive, whether the President has unfettered authority
to fire or may dismiss only for cause really does not matter. If
the existence of administrative agencies outside the three branches
provided for in the Constitution cannot be justified, 337 that is so
for reasons entirely separate from the President's inability to
fire commissioners for any reason or for no reason at all. It
greatly disserves the cause of informed debate over public policy
to pretend otherwise.
V. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
If the Bowsher opinion seems unsatisfying, the result may
not be unjustifiable. A more acceptable rationale, however, would
rely not upon the problematic removal doctrine, but instead
upon the impropriety of delegating the important budgetary
functions involved in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to unelected of-
ficials. Indeed, that was the principal basis of the challenge to
"' See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
Administrative agencies have long occupied an uncertain and somewhat anom-
alous place in our tripartite governmental structure. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,
343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (characterizing agencies as "a
veritable fourth branch of the Government" that have "deranged our three-branch legal
theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional
thinking" so much that "all recognized classifications have broken down"); PRESIDENT'S
Co:sM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE Gov-
ERNMENT OF THE UNTED STATES 36 (1937) (characterizing agencies as a "headless fourth
branch"). See generally Rabin, supra note 181; Strauss, supra note 74.
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the Act in the district court. It was the executive branch, a
nominal defendant, which most vigorously argued that the pro-
cedure for removing the Comptroller General rendered the au-
tomatic expenditure-reduction mechanism invalid.33
Only Justice Stevens devoted any attention to the delegation
issue, and his analysis differed from that of the parties. For
him, the statute's crucial defect was its assignment of "the duty
to make policy decisions that have the force of law' 33 9 to a
congressional agent, the Comptroller General. 340 Justice Stevens
explained: "If Congress were free to delegate its policymaking
authority to ... one of its agents, it would be able to evade
[the constitutional requirements for the enactment of legisla-
tion] , 41 The danger of congressional evasion of these consti-
tutional restraints "is not present when Congress delegates
lawmaking power to the executive or to an independent
agency. '342 Thus, for Justice Stevens, the relationship of the
delegate to Congress, rather than the fact of delegation, is dis-
positive.
This analysis relies heavily upon the Court's opinion in INS
v. Chadha,343 which invalidated the legislative veto. Yet the
concerns underlying that decision seem curiously misplaced in
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings context. In particular, the legis-
lative veto tended to divert congressional attention from funda-
mental policy concerns toward the minutiae of administration,
give inordinate weight to sophisticated or well-connected inter-
31 See 626 F. Supp. at 1391. The plaintiffs also argued the removal issue, however.
Id. at 1378.
339 106 S. Ct. at 3203 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
'4 Justice Stevens concluded that the Comptroller General is an agent of the
legislative branch after analyzing all of the duties assigned to that official by numerous
statutes. He recognized that the Comptroller owes some obligations to the executive
branch but found these obligations distinctly secondary to the Comptroller's responsi-
bilities to Congress. Id. at 3196-99 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
The dissenters vigorously disputed this analysis. Id. at 3213 n.13 (White, J.,
dissenting); id. at 3215 n. I (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Resolution of the question whether
the Comptroller General should be characterized as an agent of Congress is unnecessary
in light of the approach adopted in this section of the text. See infra notes 343-47 and
accompanying text.
14 106 S. Ct. at 3203 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
14 Id. (footnote omitted).
-' 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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ests, enhance the role of committee staffs, and destabilize the
policymaking process by increasing the possibility of stalemate
arising from conflicts between agencies and one or both houses
of Congress, unchecked by presidential participation. 344 Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, by contrast, effectively removed members of
Congress from an important aspect of the policymaking process
by relieving them of the necessity of voting for politically un-
palatable expenditure reductions. Both the structure and purpose
of the Act suggest that any delegate could operate with almost
complete freedom from outside influence."
The independence of the Comptroller General in this process
does not mean that the functions assigned to him could be
performed by anyone with a pocket calculator.3 6 As Justice
Stevens pointed out, those functions require the exercise of
" See, e.g., id. at 946-5 1; Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality,
63 TEx. L. REv. 207, 221-22 (1984); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HAzv. L. REv. 1369 (1977);
Nathanson, supra note 93, at 1091.
'45 Whatever pressure the delegate receives probably will be aimed at eliciting a
sufficiently low projected deficit that the automatic expenditure-reduction mechanism
will not be triggered. It seems most unlikely that anyone would seek to influence the
delegate to exempt a particular program from statutorily mandated spending cuts.
-w Recently the Court has evidenced some concern for the competence of the
delegate. For example, one decision invalidated a Civil Service Commission regulation
barring noncitizens from most federal employment; the Court emphasized the Commis-
sion's lack of responsibility for or expertise in foreign affairs and immigration and
naturalization policy, interests asserted in justification of the regulation. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114-16 (1976). Similarly, in the leading case invalidating
the legislative veto, Justice Powell found Congress' lack of institutional capacity to make
decisions of an essentially judicial nature crucial to his conclusion that the legislative
veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional. INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 960, 963-67 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). See also J.
FREEDMAN, CRisis AND LEGITIMACY 78-94 (1978) (discussing other aspects of delegation
and institutional competence).
No one questioned the Comptroller General's competence to carry out the duties
assigned him under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Many of the Comptroller's other duties
require him to make economic projections and evaluate public expenditures. See 106 S.
Ct. at 3196-98 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). These duties differ in their
scope and complexity from those involved in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, but it would be
difficult to maintain that the differences are so great as to render the Comptroller
technically incapable of performing them. It is not as though Congress had delegated
the performance of these functions to, say, the Public Printer or the Chief of Protocol
of the State Department, neither of whom has any responsibilities remotely related to
those involved in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
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"sophisticated economic judgment" on a variety of subjects.47
It does mean, though, that a more appropriate perspective on
the delegation issue would focus elsewhere than upon the rela-
tionship of the delegate to the legislative branch.
Although the Supreme Court almost uniformly has rejected
such challenges, 348 it has suggested that the crucial determinant
of the validity of any delegation of legislative power is the
specification of an "intelligible principle ' 349 or some "standards
for the guidance of the [delegate's] action.' '350 For more than a
generation, various decisions also have emphasized the impor-
tance of these standards as a basis for judicial review.3 5' One
important lower court decision went so far as to uphold the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,352 which empowered the
President "to issue such orders and regulations [implementing
wage and price controls] as he deems appropriate," based upon
a "common lore" of price controls developed in wartime and
upon the availability of judicial review of the orders and regu-
lations actually issued.3
53
Judged against such lenient criteria, it is not surprising that
the district court discerned sufficiently precise standards in
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Congress specified the maximum def-
icit amount for the fiscal year that had begun on October 1,
14 106 S. Ct. at 3199 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
34 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
The Court's extreme deference toward broad delegations of legislative power has
generated increasing criticism. See, e.g., J. ELY, DnuocpAcY AND DIsTRusT 131-34 (1980);
T. Lowi, THE END oF LIBERALSM 128-56, 297-303 (1969); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robin-
son, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CoaRNELL L. Rnv. 1, 7-17, 52-55 (1982);
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MIca.
L. REv. 1223, 1229-46 (1985). Contra Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L., ECON. & ORo. 81, 85-91 (1985). The Court
has recently implied that the delegation doctrine may have renewed vitality. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
34 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
I" Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
311 See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944); see also Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
352 Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired 1972).
313 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 748, 760-62 (D.D.C.
1971).
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1985, and for each of the five succeeding fiscal years; it provided
detailed instructions on how to implement any expenditure re-
ductions necessary to comply with the terms of the Act; and it
instructed the officials charged with projecting the deficit to
make particular assumptions in calculating the budget base.
Moreover, just as previous experience with price controls formed
part of the background of the Economic Stabilization Act, years
of experience in projecting budgetary data under the Congres-
sional Budget Act of 1974154 gave meaning to Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings.355 From this perspective, the congressional failure to
identify or define the numerous political and economic variables
that inevitably affect the magnitude of the deficit was not fatal
to the delegation.
316
Although this rather traditional lack-of-standards argument
appears unpromising, there is a much more substantial objection
to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings: that decisions respecting the budget
may not be delegated at all. This proposition goes to the heart
of the statute. It suggests that the identity of the delegate, the
technical competence of the delegate, the relationship of the
delegate to both Congress and the President, and the procedure
for removing the delegate from office are irrelevant to the basic
concern. Instead, this objection emphasizes that the political
branches have abdicated their responsibility to make the funda-
mental judgments about the size, shape, and priorities of the
federal government in all aspects of national life.
The notion that politically accountable actors must make
certain fundamental policy decisions has deep roots in American
law, especially the law relating to delegation. The Supreme Court
has implied that Congress may not delegate the taxing power35 7
and that delegations which have the effect of placing substantial
' 4 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
" See 626 F. Supp. at 1387-89.
3- The challengers especially emphasized these omissions in their arguments on the
delegation issue. See Brief of Appellees Mike Synar, Member of Congress, et al. at 36-
38; Brief for Appellee National Treasury Employees Union at 22-26.
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974)
(characterizing taxation as "a legislative function" and finding it to be "a sharp break
with our traditions" to conclude that Congress had delegated that function to an
administrative agency); see J. FanaEsAN, supra note 346, at 80-88.
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governmental power in private hands may pose serious consti-
tutional questions.358 Further, several justices in separate opin-
ions have suggested that the validity of legislation may depend
upon whether Congress actually has made important and per-
missible policy judgments. 359 Most significantly, the Court has
decided a long line of cases involving legislative apportionment
and political districting,360 cases that were specifically reaffirmed
and extended last Term in a case that held claims of partisan
gerrymandering to be justiciable.3 61 These decisions are predi-
cated upon the proposition that the Constitution guarantees
"fair and effective representation for all citizens. ' 362 Resolution
of the complexities of the concept of "fair and effective repre-
sentation" is beyond the scope of this Article.3 63 For present
purposes, it is enough to say that these decisions rest upon a
belief that determining who sits in legislatures affects what pol-
icies are adopted.3 64 At a minimum, this belief requires the
151 The Court has made this point in various contexts. With respect to delegations
at the federal level, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). See
generally Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937). For
discussion of delegations at the state and local levels, see, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 120-22 (1982); Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116, 121-22 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1912); but
see City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). See generally
F. MicHELmAN & T. SADALow, MATERIALS ON GoVaNMTr IN URAN AREAS 111-55
(1970).
39 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244-45 & n.5 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
E.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
36! Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2803-07 (1986).
362 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964). Accord, e.g., Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 141 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966).
13' For discussion of various theories of and justification for representation, see,
e.g., R. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 24-33 (1968); Mansfield, Impartial
Representation, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION 91, 110-13 (R. Goldwin ed.
1968); Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, in REPRESENTATION 1, 6-23 (H. Pitkin
ed. 1969). See also A. BICKEL, PoLITIcs AND THE WARREN COURT 196-98 (1965); Baker,
One Person, One Vote: "Fair and Effective Representation"?, in REPRESENTATION AND
MISREPRESENTATION 71, 77-81 (R. Goldwin ed. 1968).
31 See, e.g., R. McKAY, REAPPORToNMENT 55-58 (1965). But see R. DIXON, supra
note 363, at 574-81 (suggesting only a modest correlation between malapportionment
and substantive policies).
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further assumption that legislators actually will vote on those
policies rather than delegating the most fundamental political
judgments to appointed officials who are not directly account-
able to the electorate. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, by enabling
Congress to do just that, violated this cardinal principle. 65
The district court almost summarily disposed of this per se
nondelegability argument. The court reasoned that delegations
of the powers to tax and to declare certain conduct criminal,
which it viewed as at least as important as the spending power,
had been upheld. Further, the lower court could discern no
principled basis for identifying those core functions which Con-
gress may not delegate.
366
Each aspect of this analysis is superficially appealing but
ultimately unsatisfying. Most of the earlier decisions upholding
delegations involved specific factual determinations concerning
particular foreign policy matters that were peculiarly within the
special competence of the President, new or highly technical
subjects, or the management of public property. 67 The case upon
which the district court principally relied in rejecting the non-
delegability claim368 will not bear the weight placed upon it. That
decision simply upheld a statute authorizing the President to
adjust tariff rates, a situation in which "the scope of the power
and the discretion involved [were] fairly limited. ' 3 69 By contrast,
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings delegated the power to make binding
decisions respecting public expenditures to an appointed officer
who has never had to account for his actions to the electorate. 370
?- The notion that Congress may not delegate certain essential political judgments
to appointed officers who are not publicly accountable receives analogical support from
the field of corporate law. Although the board of directors of a corporation generally
has broad discretion to create committees, it may not under any circumstances delegate some
vital functions that substantially affect the rights of shareholders to itself. Those functions
include decisions relating to the declaration of a dividend, most mergers, sales of substan-
tially all the corporate assets, amendments to the articles of incorporation, and voluntary
dissolution. See generally ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 8.25(e) & Official Comment
(3d ed. 1984).
626 F. Supp. at 1385-86 & n.10.
See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRuFF, THE ADMINsrxATivE PROCESS 70-
71 (3d ed. 1986).
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
; Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 348, at 8.
' Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This Buck?, 64
TEX. L. REv. 131, 134-37 (1985).
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Thus, the extent of the delegation was considerably broader than
those which the district court cited in support of its conclusion.
Even more troubling, that court also failed to note the unusual
importance of the budget for the making of public policy.
The centrality of the budget to our politics, in the highest
sense of the term, has long been recognized. The budget has
been characterized as "the nearest thing available to an agenda
for [the] struggle over [the] scope and shape of government
' 37'
and as the record of the outcome of the "conflict over whose
preferences shall prevail in the determination of national pol-
icy.' 372 As Aaron Wildavsky has explained:
The size and shape of the budget is a matter of serious
contention in our political life. Presidents, political parties,
administrators, Congressmen, interest groups, and interested
citizens vie with one another to have their preferences recorded
in the budget. The victories and defeats, the compromises and
the bargains, the realms of agreement and the spheres of
conflict in regard to the role of national government in our
society all appear in the budget. In the most integral sense the
budget lies at the heart of the political process. 73
In short, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings represented an extraor-
dinary flight from political responsibility by the nation's elected
officials.374 To be sure, these officials might require the advice
"I R. NEUSTADT, supra note 4, at 83.
372 A. VILDAVSKY, supra note 14, at 4. The same scholar observes that "[t]he
crucial aspect of budgeting is whose preferences are to prevail in disputes about which
activities are to be carried on and to what degree, in the light of limited resources." Id.
at 129.
373 Id. at 4-5.
Further evidence of the crucial political importance of governmental budgets comes
from the New England town meeting, perhaps the prototypical democratic institution in
the United States. The budget almost invariably is the first item on the warrant (or
agenda) of the town meeting, although no statute requires this practice. See CoNN. Gm.
STAT. ANN. § 7-3 (,Vest 1972 & Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2052 (,Vest
1978); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 39, § 10 (West 1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-
2 (RepI. ed. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-3-8 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §9
2641-2642 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
3- Indeed, the principal sponsors frankly admitted that they had introduced their
legislation out of frustration over the failure of previous attempts to reduce the deficit.
See, e.g., 131 CONG. REc. S12082 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Gramm);
id. at 512085 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Rudman).
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of specialized professionals to calculate specific figures under
various economic assumptions. Nevertheless, the results of those
calculations must be formally approved by politically accounta-
ble elected officials precisely because the contents of the budget
reflect fundamentally political judgments. The inability or un-
willingness of both Congress and the President to perform this
essential function suggests a serious breakdown of governmental
processes.
Although Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was a substantial abdi-
cation of responsibility by the political branches, a conscientious
Court still might have been reluctant to invalidate the law on
delegation grounds. First, even if the law were enacted due to a
failure of political will, it might have been the only means
available for dealing with what was widely viewed as a serious
national problem. Perhaps, in other words, members of Con-
gress accepted Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as a sort of public pol-
icy lottery; no majority could agree upon precisely what should
be done, but an actual majority thought some new policy was
appropriate and regarded the possibilities under this legislation
as superior to preserving the status quo.
375
Second, although the authorities invoked by the district court
ultimately are unpersuasive on the point, a holding that some
legislative functions are absolutely nondelegable might call into
question the validity of a great deal more of the activities of the
modern administrative state than a ruling based upon the arcana
of the removal power. Numerous agencies with responsibility for
broad aspects of the nation's economic and social affairs enjoy
extensive authority to promulgate regulations that have the force
of law. Violators of some of these regulations face substantial
civil and, in many instances, criminal liability. Even the most
carefully phrased judicial opinion necessarily would leave serious
ambiguities and cast long shadows that could not be eliminated
by a minor statutory amendment.
Third, precisely because an expansive holding of per se non-
delegability could have such broad ramifications, a court might
conclude that the standards contained in the statute, while less
1 See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 348, at 60-62; Mashaw, supra
note 348, at 85.
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precise than they might have been, provided sufficient guidance
both for the Comptroller General and for any judicial tribunal
called upon to review the implementation of the law. The Act
contained specific assumptions to be used in projecting the def-
icit and provided a formula for the allocation of any required
spending reductions. Although the Act did not offer guidance
concerning the broader economic assumptions to be incorporated
into the estimates of revenues and expenditures, and although
economic forecasting is as much art as science, it is far from
certain that Congress could have elicited more accurate data
about those large questions through legislation than by delega-
tion of the entire problem to the informed judgment of the
Comptroller General and the other officials involved in the
process.
Finally, a judicial remedy for even the most serious forms
of political irresponsibility may not be appropriate. Members of
Congress are accountable to the electorate at regular intervals.
If their inability or unwillingness to take a position on a major
national issue offends their constituents, the voters will have an
early opportunity to make their displeasure known in the most
effective possible fashion: by defeating irresponsible incumbents
at the polls.
Resolving these problems is a task for another day. For now,
it suffices to say that they were the important questions in the
Bowsher litigation. Requiring Congress and the President, rather
than the Comptroller General or any other appointed official,
to make fundamental political decisions fixes responsibility for
those decisions upon actors who are accountable to the elector-
ate. The voters, in turn, may approve or disapprove of those
decisions, or they may not care about them at all. They at least
will have an opportunity to pass judgment upon the actors who
made the ultimate decisions. Vesting this authority in appointed
experts suggests that the federal budget has become too impor-
tant to be left to the politicians. That suggestion has profound
and troubling implications for our system of government.37 6 Un-
fortunately, none of the opinions even allude to such questions.
3716 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 26, at 1086-104.
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CONCLUSION
Interbranch disputes are a perennial feature of American
government. Two models have emerged for resolution of such
problems. One focuses with increasing formality upon maintain-
ing the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
The other emphasizes a more contextual analysis of the checks
and balances that might prevent one branch from aggrandizing
its position at the expense of another. Just as the dynamics of
our political system assure the inevitability of interbranch con-
flict, so also does this reality guarantee that the debate between
the more absolutist separation-of-powers advocates and the more
flexible checks-and-balancers will not cease. Indeed, the vicissi-
tudes of politics suggest that many individuals will find them-
selves switching camps as new and unforeseen situations arise.
Controversy over the removal power has been the source of
recurrent conflict between Congress and the President. Although
it is necessary to have some generally accepted principles on this
subject, executive claims to exclusive prerogative and judicial
attempts to limit legislative participation are unlikely to resolve
the underlying tension. Whatever rule governs, Congress has less
drastic weapons in its arsenal that give it more effective control
over administrative behavior than the draconian sanction of
removal.
For this reason, the Court's highly formalistic opinion re-
solving the litigation over Gramm-Rudman-Holings was intel-
lectually unsatisfying. The Court's conclusion followed from the
somewhat dubious premises of the precedents dealing with the
removal power. A more persuasive solution was available, but
only at the cost of raising doubts about the constitutionality of
the modern administrative state.
One might speculate that at least some members of the Court
understood the larger questions posed by so serious an abdica-
tion of responsibility by the political branches but also shrank
from the implications of answering those questions. Those jus-
tices might have expected a narrow holding based upon the
removal issue to force the political branches to do what they
should have done in the first place to reduce the deficit without
causing doctrinal confusion. Thus, this approach could be seen
as a means of conserving judicial capital. In light of Congress'
1987]
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failure to agree upon how to repair the Gramm-Rudman-Holl-
ings mechanism, the Court's gamble may be said to have paid
off. This institutional success, however, cannot conceal a more
disturbing irony: a lawsuit brought to promote political, and
especially legislative, responsibility produced a result that at least
rhetorically enhances executive power.
